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Introduction 
An important function of legal theory is to provide a framework 
for understanding the common law and its regulatory substitutes. 
Now that horizontal slickwater fracturing has renewed popular and 
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academic interest in the governance of subsurface resource pools, it is 
helpful to apply property theory to understand the law’s response to 
issues concerning resources that lie under, or can be extracted only by 
going under, more than one piece of property. If property theory is to 
be helpful, it ought to sharpen our ability to correctly diagnose the 
social problems addressed by the law and to identify the coherence of, 
and justification for, the law’s response to those problems. 
By this measure, property theory has underserved our understanding 
of both the problem of subsurface resource pools and the law’s 
response to that problem. Property theory was ill-equipped to address 
the problem of subsurface resource pools because it had only two 
paradigms for identifying and addressing the problem: a paradigm of 
private property and a paradigm of commons property. Because neither 
paradigm adequately addresses the problem of subsurface resource 
pools, the law applicable to water, oil, and gas has been misunderstood 
and mischaracterized. 
In this Article, we argue that property theory, appropriately 
understood, shows that subsurface water, oil, and gas ought to be 
treated as shared property that can be exploited, if it is to be exploited 
at all, by the coordinating agreements of owners of the surface property, 
or their licensees, supervised by common law courts. We therefore offer 
the paradigm of shared property as the appropriate analysis for 
thinking about the law’s approach to rights in oil and natural gas. We 
also argue that the shared property paradigm is largely consistent with 
the common law’s approach to subsurface resource pools, even though 
conventional understanding of the law vacillates between the private 
property and commons property paradigms. 
Much of this Article is revisionist. We argue, unconventionally, 
that the common law embraced the paradigm of shared property in 
much of its regulation of subsurface resource pools because it 
essentially treated those resources as owned by tenants in common, as 
modified by the common law nuisance exception for injuries to 
subsurface resource pools. Under this reading, the special common law 
rules regarding subsurface resource pools have been misunderstood either 
as providing for (1) commons property treatment of subsurface resource 
pools underground followed by private property treatment after the 
resources are extracted from the subsurface pools or (2) private property 
treatment of the resources even while underground but subject to loss 
of title if the resources crossed property boundaries. Under our reading 
of the cases, when interpreted against the paradigm of shared property, 
the common law consistently recognized shared ownership of subsurface 
resource pools yet limited surface owner’s rights to quiet enjoyment of 
subsurface resource pools based solely on courts’ own perceived 
incapacity, because the resources are hidden, to understand the causal 
relationship between land use and disruption of enjoyment of subsurface 
resource pools. But this limit did not prevent courts from coordinating 
the exploitation of subsurface resource pools between surface owners by 
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recognizing causes of action for malicious interference, waste, and 
unreasonable exploitation. 
This analysis supports our claim that the property issues inherent 
in today’s concerns over horizontal slickwater fracturing can be 
addressed under private agreements that are subject to judicial 
supervision.1 Moreover, because we now have the seismic technology 
to understand resource location and flows, the common law’s reluctance 
to provide common owners of shared property with an accounting 
should dissipate. 
Part I examines in detail the common law of subsurface resource 
pools. Part II demonstrates this common law of subsurface resource 
pools is an application of the shared property paradigm. Part III 
suggests that judicially supervised private governance regimes can 
ensure that subsurface resource pools are exploited efficiently and fairly.  
I. Correcting the Conventional Views of the  
Law of Subsurface Resource Pools 
Analytically, subsurface resource pools of oil, gas, and water pose 
distinctive problems for courts because of two distinguishing 
characteristics. First, subsurface resource pools are not visible from 
the surface. Second, these resources are fluids that are susceptible to 
movement across property lines or that (as in the case of horizontal 
slickwater fracturing) can be extracted only by activities that are not 
confined within property boundaries. The common law courts 
responded to these characteristics in two opposing ways. On the one 
hand, emphasizing the hidden nature of the resource, common law 
courts have consistently held that interference with a surface owner’s 
enjoyment of the resource is generally not actionable. On the other 
hand, common law courts responded to the migratory character of 
subsurface resources by recognizing actions for malicious interference, 
waste, and unreasonable exploitation. The hidden character limited 
the law’s protections for the quiet enjoyment of subsurface resource 
pools, whereas the migratory character gave rise to causes of action 
that coordinated uses between owners. 
These two characteristics gave rise, in other words, to legal 
approaches that varied with the question courts were considering. 
These variations, in turn, made it difficult for theorists to pin down a 
 
1. Oil and gas recovered from shale deposits is different from other pooled 
resources in that it does not migrate as easily from one location to 
another. Nonetheless, we can apply the property regimes developed for 
common pool resources to the property regimes applied to hydraulic 
fracturing because of their similarities. The law applicable to oil and gas 
has always taken its migratory nature into account; gas recovered from 
shale migrates less but can be effectively recovered only by horizontal 
drilling that crosses surface boundaries. The oil and gas do not migrate 
but the method of extraction, in a sense, does.  
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theory of subsurface resources that adequately described the range of 
decisions that courts were making. Moreover, theorists were limited in 
the paradigms around which they could organize their interpretation 
of legal doctrine. In Part I.A, we summarize the conventional 
theoretical approaches and explain their inadequacy.  
A. Conventional Views of the Law of Subsurface Resource Pools: 
Ferae Naturae, Ad Coelum, and “Drill, Baby, Drill!” 
Uncounted first-year property students encounter the following in 
a leading property casebook:  
Oil and natural gas commonly collect in reservoirs that underlie 
many acres of land owned by many different people. The 
resources have a fugitive character in that they wander from 
place to place. Oil or gas once under the land of A might 
migrate to space under the land of B as the result of natural 
circumstances or because B drops a well and mines a common 
pool beneath A’s and B’s land. . . . 
When these obviously problematic situations first led to 
litigation—usually (but not always) a suit by someone like A to 
recover the value of gas or oil drawn away by someone like B—
the courts were induced by the fugitive nature of the resources 
in question to liken them to wild animals. And because 
ownership of wild animals had long been settled in terms of the 
rule of capture, the courts reasoned that ownership of oil and 
gas should be determined in the same manner.2 
This characterization reflects one of three conventional conceptions of 
the common law of subsurface resource pools—namely that because 
resources in subsurface pools are migratory, like wild animals, they 
are unowned until captured, and once captured, title vests in the 
captor.3 Under this ferae naturae4 view, water, oil, and gas are 
commons property while they remain underground. 
 
2. Dukeminier et al., Property 36 (7th ed. 2010) (footnote omitted). 
3. Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as 
Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 Tex. L. Rev. 391, 393 (1935) (“The owner 
of a tract of land acquires title to the oil or gas which he produces from 
wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil or 
gas migrated from adjoining lands. The antithesis of the rule of capture 
is: The owner of a tract of land owns the oil and gas in place and, 
should such minerals migrate to a neighbor’s land and be produced from 
wells thereon, title would not vest in the neighbor, but, to the contrary, 
the migrating oil or gas, or at least an amount equal to that which 
migrated, could be recovered by the true owner.”); see also Laura H. 
Burney, A Pragmatic Approach to Decision Making in the Next Era of 
Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. Energy Nat. Resources & Envtl. 
L. 1, 9 (1996) (“By analogizing to the common-law rule used to 
determine rights in wild animals (ferae naturae), courts adopted the rule 
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers another conventional 
conception of the common law of subsurface resource pools: 
The “English rule” relating to the use of ground water was 
adopted in a number of American states. It gave each landowner 
complete freedom to withdraw and use ground water and made 
no attempt to apportion the supply among possessors off 
overlying land . . . . It was based on the premise that groundwater 
is the absolute property of the owner of the freehold, like the 
rocks, soil and minerals that compose it, so that he is free to 
withdraw it at will and do with it as he pleases regardless of the 
effect upon his neighbors. . . . Although framed in property 
language, the rule was in reality a rule of capture, for a 
landowner’s pump could induce water under the land of his 
neighbor to flow to his well—water that was in theory the 
neighbor’s property while it remained in place.5 
Under this view, because the surface owner owns the land, it logically 
follows that the surface owner must absolutely own the subsurface 
resource pools contained within it and be privileged to “do with it as 
he pleases.”6 Under this ad coelum view, water, oil, and gas are owned 
by the owner of the surface under which they lie, but ownership is 
transferred as water, oil, and gas cross the property line from one 
surface owner to another.7 Further, it follows from the absolute nature 
 
of capture to define a property owner’s rights in oil and gas beneath her 
property. Under the rule of capture, an owner of land ‘acquires title to 
the oil or gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon.’” (quoting 
Hardwicke, supra note 3, at 393)); Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation 
Through Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle to Marine Resource 
Conservation, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3, 50 (2004) (“Under the rule 
of capture, landowners acquire property rights to oil upon extraction.”). 
4.  This translates to “of a wild nature.” Black’s Law Dictionary 696 
(9th ed. 2009). 
5. Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 41, topic 4, intro. note (1979); 
see also Dukeminier et al., supra note 2, at 37–38 (“Groundwater 
(water found in underground aquifers) . . . was governed early on by the 
English rule of absolute ownership, which allowed each landowner over 
an aquifer to withdraw freely without regard to effects on neighbors.”). 
6. Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 41, topic 4, introductory note, 
at 256 (1977). 
7. The ad coelum phrase comes from the Latin expression cujus est solum, 
ejus est usque ad coelum et infera—“whoever owns the soil, it is theirs 
all the way up to Heaven and down to Hell.” The phrase was coined by 
a medieval, not ancient, Italian, Accursius. See Clement L. Bouvé, 
Private Ownership of Airspace, 1 Air L. Rev. 232, 246 (1930) 
(providing a general discussion of the Latin phrase, its origin, and its 
place in Roman Law). It was popularized by Blackstone five centuries 
later. See 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *18. This concept 
has not been especially helpful and courts have spent a good deal of 
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of the ownership of the resources while they are beneath the surface 
owner’s property that the surface owner is privileged to extract it and 
thereby cause additional water, oil, or gas to migrate across the 
boundary and become his property.  
Still a third conventional view comes from one historically prominent 
commentator, Walter Summers, who is agnostic as to the ownership of 
resources in subsurface pools—subscribing neither to the ferae naturae 
view nor the ad coelum view—but adamant that extraction is 
privileged and immune from claims of unlawful drainage because 
otherwise the resources could not be exploited.8 For Summers, any 
surface owner could protect her interests by drilling faster than her 
neighbors. This rather pragmatic view is not easily denominated by a 
venerable Latin phrase, but is best summed up by the more recent 
political jingoism, “Drill, baby, drill!” 
These conventional theories about the grounds on which courts 
were regulating subsurface resource pools dramatically reflect a near 
myopic focus on one feature of the legal regime—the ability of one 
surface owner to legally drain oil and gas from beneath a neighbor’s 
property. This feature of the law entered popular culture with the 
2007 film There Will Be Blood, in which Daniel Plainview shouted at 
his rival in the climactic final scene: 
 
time and energy in attempts to get out from under its burdensome logic. 
See, e.g., Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936) 
(rejecting a literal interpretation of the ad coelom doctrine and holding 
that landowners only own “the space above the ground” the owner “can 
occupy or make use of” as “[a]ll that lies beyond belongs to the world”). 
8. Walter L. Summers, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 24, 
at 71–72 (1927) (“Suppose A is the owner in fee of a tract of land, 
Blackacre, . . . and that B is a like owner of a nearby or adjoining tract of 
land, Whiteacre, and that beneath these there is an oil and gas 
reservoir . . . . Suppose, further, that A drills a well upon Blackacre, 
tapping the oil or gas reservoir at such a point that by the natural 
pressure existing in the reservoir oil or gas come from under B’s land, 
Whiteacre, into A’s well on Blackacre, and are so reduced to actual 
possession by A; have B’s legal rights in respect to the oil or gas in situ 
under Whiteacre been violated? Or, to put it another way, was A legally 
privileged to take the oil and gas from under Whiteacre in the manner 
described? The courts are of the unanimous opinion that A’s acts of 
taking oil or gas in the manner described from under both tracts of land 
are legally privileged, and that B has no rights that A so take the oil and 
gas from Whiteacre by acts lawfully done upon Blackacre as above 
described.”); W.L. Summers, Legal Rights Against Drainage of Oil and 
Gas, 18 Texas L. Rev. 27, 29 (1939) (“[Courts] knew that one landowner 
could not produce from his land without taking some of the oil and gas 
from adjacent lands, but they were likewise aware of the fact that the 
economic value of oil and gas could not be realized without production; 
consequently, they ruled in favor of unlimited privileges of taking.”). 
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Drainage! Drainage, Eli, you boy. Drained dry. I’m so sorry. 
Here, if you have a milkshake, and I have a milkshake, and I 
have a straw. There it is, that’s a straw, you see? You 
watching? And my straw reaches across the room, and starts to 
drink your milkshake. I drink your milkshake! I drink it up!9 
 
9. There Will Be Blood (Paramount Vantage and Miramax Films 
2007). In the scene, Plainview is explaining that he has already extracted 
the oil beneath a certain property despite never drilling on its surface. 
Director Paul Thomas Anderson, who received an Academy Award 
nomination for the screenplay, told several media outlets that the film’s 
iconic “I drink your milkshake” lines “came straight from a transcript 
[Anderson] found of the 1924 congressional hearings over the Teapot 
Dome scandal.” Scott Bowles, ‘Blood’ Fans Drink Up Milkshake 
Catchphrase, USA Today (Feb. 4, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ 
life/movies/news/2008-02-03-blood-milkshake_N.htm (“In explaining oil 
drainage, [former Secretary of the Interior Albert] Fall’s ‘way of 
describing it was to say “Sir, if you have a milkshake and I have a 
milkshake and my straw reaches across the room, I’ll end up drinking 
your milkshake,” ’ Anderson says. ‘I just took this insane concept and 
used it.’ ”); see also Scott Foundas, Paul Thomas Anderson: Blood, 
Sweat and Tears, L.A. Wkly. (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.laweekly.com/ 
2008-01-17/film-tv/blood-sweat-and-tears (“I’m sure I embellished it and 
changed it around and made it more Plainview. But Fall used the word 
‘milk shake,’ and I thought it was so great.”). Many film-related 
websites and blogs reproduced Anderson’s anecdote about the origin of 
the lines. 
But searches of the transcripts of the relevant Teapot Dome 
investigation hearings produced no testimony or other record similar to 
what Anderson described. Leases upon Navy Oil Reserves: Hearing on 
S. Res. 147, 282, 294, and 434, Before the S. Comm. on Public Lands 
and Surveys, 67th–68th Cong. (1923–1924). No form of the word “milk 
shake” was found in the transcripts, and the few mentions of other 
words central to the quoted lines, like “straw” and “drink,” appear only 
in unrelated contexts. However, the Congressional Record does contain a 
discussion of subsurface resource extraction—from eighty years later— 
with specific imagery very similar to the film’s. In 2003, Senator Peter 
Domenici remarked on the Senate floor during a debate over drilling in 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge:  
And you see, way far away, the oil is underground, and it is 
going to be drilled and come up . . . . Here is a giant reservoir 
underground. . . . [J]ust like a curved straw, you put it 
underground and maneuver it, and the “milk shake” is way over 
there, and your little child wants the milk shake, and they sit 
over here in their bedroom where they are feeling ill, and they 
just gobble it up from way down in the kitchen, where you don't 
even have to move the Mix Master that made the ice cream for 
them. You don't have to take it up to the bedroom. This 
describes the actual drilling that is taking place. 
149 Cong. Rec. 6729 (2003). Coincidentally, both Fall (1912–1921) and 
Domenici (1973–2009) represented New Mexico in the Senate. 
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Although the conventional views explain drainage rights in 
reassuringly simple ways, they do not reflect what courts have said or 
done over the last century. Instead, they reflect the failure of property 
theory to develop the appropriate paradigm for addressing the social 
issues raised by subsurface resource pools. In particular, they reflect 
an attempt to shoehorn our understanding of judicial treatment of 
subsurface resource pools into the familiar commons property and 
private property paradigms. In actuality, courts were applying a shared 
property paradigm, one adjusted to account for the fact that subsurface 
resources are hidden from view. 
In our revisionist description of the common law, we show that 
when faced with questions about the disruption of subsurface resource 
pools, courts were not concerned about title but about the hidden 
nature of the resources and the resulting inability of courts to 
determine which oil and gas was underneath which surface property. 
Instead of focusing on the capture of wild animals, courts held that 
injuries to subsurface oil and gas are damnum absque injuria by 
analogy to earlier cases dealing with subsurface water. Moreover, 
although courts could not offer a remedy for diminution of subsurface 
resource pools because the resources were hidden, the migratory 
nature of the resources induced courts to develop several doctrines 
that required each surface owner to take into account the interests of 
other surface owners when deciding how to exploit the subsurface 
common pool resource: causes of action for malicious interference, 
waste, and unreasonable exploitation. Far from following the 
conventional ferae naturae view, the ad coelum view, or a “Dril, 
Baby, Drill!” view, the common law recognized, on the one hand, 
limits on the judicial ability to regulate hidden resources (the subject 
of Part I.B) while, on the other hand, recognizing the responsibilities 
that arose from shared migratory ownership of subsurface resource 
pools (the subject of Part I.C).  
B. Response to the Hidden Nature of Subsurface Resource Pools: 
Disrupting Subsurface Resource Pools is Damnum Absque Injuria 
When common law courts were called on to resolve disputes 
arising from one owner’s complaints about neighboring activities that 
interfered with the owner’s enjoyment of subsurface water, oil, or gas, 
they refused to provide a remedy. The activities complained of were 
quite varied, but courts invariably held that interferences with 
subsurface water, oil, and gas were damnum absque injuria because of 
the hidden character of these resources.  
The term damnum absque injuria, damage without injury, denotes 
a conclusion without revealing the reason for the conclusion, for the 
distinction between “damage with injury” and “damage without injury” 
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is unexplained.10 This is because damnum absque injuria simply 
announces a common law result—it conveys neither a justification for, 
nor a description of, a particular kind of injury.11 It is of considerable 
vintage, going back at least as far as Hamlyn v. More, the 1410 case 
exempting fair competition from nuisance liability.12 It means that a 
 
10. Chief Justice Marshall invoked the damnum absque injuria framework in 
the second inquiry in Marbury v. Madison: 
It behooves us then to enquire whether there be in its composition 
any ingredient which shall exempt it from legal investigation, or 
exclude the injured party from legal redress. In pursuing this 
enquiry the first question which presents itself, is, whether this 
can be arranged with the class of cases which come under the 
description of damnum absque injuria—a loss without an injury. 
This description of cases never has been considered, and it is 
believed never can be considered, as comprehending offices of 
trust, of honor or of profit. The office of justice of peace in the 
district of Columbia is such an office; it is therefore worthy of 
the attention and guardianship of the laws. It has received that 
attention and guardianship. . . . It is not then on account of the 
worthlessness of the thing pursued, that the injured party can be 
alleged to be without remedy. 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163–64 (1803). As in other 
cases, Marbury provides no meaningful distinction between, in the 
language of Marshall, loss without injury and loss with injury. It is, as 
always, a maxim denoting a result but not a justification for the result.  
11. The damnum absque injuria cases are similar to judicial cognizability 
requirements for causes of action brought in federal court in origin as well 
as substance. The common law nuisance cause of action and its exceptions 
under the damnum absque injuria framework originated in the English 
crown courts. The crown courts in that time exercised jurisdiction alongside 
seigniorial courts, as the federal courts exercise jurisdiction alongside state 
courts. This dual judicial structure breeds wholesale rejections of entire 
classes of causes of action as the superior judicial body shapes and 
optimizes its jurisdiction. Seigniorial courts were unwilling to limit 
jurisdiction or reject classes of actions as this would restrict a lord’s power 
without any benefit to the lord. In any given case, the seigniorial court 
could just rule against a particular plaintiff without limiting the power to 
decide a similar dispute in the future. When American states imported the 
common law of the English crown courts, they imported the practice of 
jurisdictional optimization as well and it continued unabated, perhaps 
because it had by that time proved so beneficial to the growth and 
development of the English legal system.  
12. Hamlyn v. More, Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 47, Hil., pl. 21 (1410) (Eng.); 
John Baker, Baker and Milsom: Sources of English Legal 
History 671–73 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2010) (1986) [hereinafter 
Baker & Milsom]. Before Hamlyn v. More, proprietors of capital 
projects could sue upstart competition. See Robert D. Cheren, Note, 
Tragic Parlor Pigs and Comedic Rascally Rabbits: Why Common Law 
Nuisance Exceptions Refute Coase’s Economic Analysis of the Law, 63 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 555, 572 (2012). 
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court has determined that (1) a class of injuries never gives rise to 
nuisance liability, (2) a class of activities is immune from nuisance 
liability, or (3) injuries suffered at the hand of a class of causal agents 
never give rise to nuisance liability. The common law limitation on 
actions for interference with subsurface water, oil, and gas and the 
American rule on light and air are of the first type.13 The privilege to 
inflict injury through fair competition (an exception to the nuisance 
concept), is of the second type.14 The English rule exempting activities 
and injuries from the nuisance regime if the harm flows through wild 
animals is of the third type.15 In each of these cases, common law 
courts held that a nuisance action does not lie.  
The common law limitation on actions for interference with 
subsurface water, oil, and gas can be traced to the English case of 
Acton v. Blundell.16 In Acton, the court held that a neighbor’s 
interference with subsurface (as opposed to visible) water resources 
was damnum absque injuria. A cotton-spinner brought an action 
against an operator of a coal pit whose mining activities allegedly 
interfered with the cotton-spinner’s use and application of “the water 
of certain underground springs, streams, and watercourses” in the 
cotton-spinner’s operation of his mill.17 The supply of water was at 
first “considerably diminished” and ultimately “rendered altogether 
 
13. See Acton v. Blundell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Exch.); 12 M. & W. 
324 (Eng.); Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc, 
168 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1964). 
14. See Hamlyn v. More, Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 47, Hil., pl. 21 (1410) (Eng.); 
Baker & Milsom, supra note 13, at 672. 
15. See Boulston v. Hardy, (1596) 77 Eng. Rep. 216 (C.P.); Bowlston v. 
Hardy, (1596) 78 Eng. Rep. 794 (C.P.). 
16. Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223; 12 M. & W. 324. A Massachusetts case from 
1836 held an interference with subsurface water damnum absque injuria, 
but with the important caveat that the plaintiff had not gained prescriptive 
rights to the water by adverse use for twenty years. Greenleaf v. Francis, 
35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117, 122–23 (1836). The plaintiff’s claim is so well 
and succinctly expressed by the court it is worth repeating here:  
[T]he defendant dug to obtain water in his own soil, and in a 
place where it was convenient for him, near to the well of the 
plaintiff, and after the defendant’s well was dug, the water ceased 
to flow into the plaintiff’s well, so copiously as it did before. 
Id. at 122. The dissonance between Greenleaf and Acton was made 
evident by an 1868 Massachusetts decision affirming a trial court’s 
refusal to give a defendant the benefit of an Acton instruction and 
directing verdict for a plaintiff in a case where manure stored in a 
subterranean vault polluted a neighbor’s cellar and well. Ball v. Nye, 99 
Mass. 582, 583–84 (1868). The defendant had requested the jury be 
instructed that, if liable at all, the defendant could only be liable for the 
pollution of the neighbor’s cellar, not the well. Id. at 583. 
17. Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1232; 12 M. & W. at 347 (Tindal C.J.). 
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insufficient for the purposes of the mill” by the coal mining.18 It was 
well established at the time of Acton that  
each proprietor of the land has a right to the advantage of the 
stream flowing in its natural course over his land, to use the 
same as he pleases, for any purposes of his own, not inconsistent 
with a similar right in the proprietors of the land above or 
below; so that, neither can any proprietor above diminish the 
quantity or injure the quality of the water which would 
otherwise naturally descend, nor can any proprietor below throw 
back the water without the license or the grant of the proprietor 
above.19 
If this principle applied equally to “the enjoyment of underground 
springs, or to a well supplied thereby” then “undoubtedly” the operator 
of the coal mill “could not justify the sinking of the coal-pits” to the 
detriment of the cotton-spinner.20 The court held the principle did not 
equally apply and that an interference with the enjoyment of 
subsurface water courses is “not to be governed by the law which 
applies to” surface water courses.21 Rather, the court held such 
interferences are governed by 
that principle, which gives to the owner of the soil all that lies 
beneath his surface; that the land immediately below is his 
property, whether it is solid rock, or porous ground, or venous 
earth, or part soil, part water; that the person who owns the 
surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there found to his 
own purposes at his free will and pleasure; and that if, in the 
exercise of such right, he intercepts or drains off the water 
collected from underground springs in his neighbour’s well, this 
inconvenience to his neighbour falls within the description of 
damnum absque injuria, which cannot become the ground of an 
action.22 
Although the court invoked the talisman of ad coelum in its holding, 
it reached the damnum absque injuria result after considering both 
 
18. Id. at 1233; 12 M. & W. at 348. 
19. Id. at 1233; 12 M. & W. at 349; see also Henrici de Bracton, De 
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae f. 232b (Samuel E. Thorne ed. 
& trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1977) (ca. 1245–1257); Ranulf de 
Glanvill, Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni 
Anglie qui Glanvilla Vocatur bk. XIII, c. 36 (G.D.G. Hall ed. & 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (ca. 1187–1189); Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 
F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827). 
20. Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1233; 12 M. & W. at 349. 
21. Id. at 1235; 12 M. & W. at 353. 
22. Id.; 12 M. & W. at 354. 
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the role of custom in the common law regulation of surface water 
courses and the difficulty that would arise from the common law 
regulation of subsurface resources. The damnum absque injuria results 
in Acton and its progeny are based on a judicial sense of incapacity in 
view of the hidden character of subsurface resource pools.23 
The decisional progeny of Acton are legion. The majority of cases, 
like Acton, dealt with subsurface water, rather than oil or gas.24 Soon 
 
23. Cheren, supra note 13, at 591; see also Maricopa Cnty. Mun. Water 
Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. Sw. Cotton Co., 4 P.2d 369, 383 (Ariz. 
1931) (“Surface waters are plainly visible, definitely ascertainable, and 
the effect of their appropriation generally easily foreseen and understood 
by all. Subterranean waters are necessarily more or less uncertain as to 
their very existence, speculative as to their character, and frequently 
incapable of an immediate demonstration of the results of their 
appropriation of such a nature that investors may safely stake their 
funds and farmers their future on the success of the project.”); Roath v. 
Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 542 (1850) (“[Surface streams] are recognized as 
private property: and their use is regulated by principles of obvious 
equity and necessity. Their nature is defined; their progress over the 
surface seen, and known, and uniform. They are not in the secret places 
of the earth, and a part of it; nor is there any secresy in the influences 
which move them. As soon as they appear and pass over the surface, 
they assume a distinct character, and are subject to the great law of 
gravitation. The purchaser of land knows what he purchases, and what 
controul he can exercise over such a stream, and what are the rights of 
those above or below him. Each may use them as the common 
atmosphere; but none can injuriously interrupt their progress, or render 
them unfit for common use. Their laws are as fixed and public, as the 
laws of freehold estates.”); Upjohn v. Bd. of Health, 9 N.W. 845, 848 
(Mich. 1881) (“The movements of subsurface waters are commonly so 
obscure that rights in or respecting them cannot well be preserved. They 
do not often have a well-defined channel, and it is not easy in many 
cases to determine in what direction their movements tend. If corrupted 
at one point the effect may be confined within very narrow limits, while 
at another, though no surface indications would lead one to expect it, 
the taint might follow the water for miles. In some cases a new well at a 
considerable distance from an old one may withdraw the water from the 
other and destroy it, while in other cases, in which the same result 
would seem more likely, there is no perceptible influence.”); Chatfield v. 
Wilson, 28 Vt. 49, 54 (1855) (“The secret, changeable, and 
uncontrollable character of underground water in its operations, is so 
diverse and uncertain that we cannot well subject it to the regulations 
of law, nor build upon it a system of rules, as is done in the case of 
surface streams.”). 
24. Sw. Cotton, 4 P.2d at 383; Roath, 20 Conn. 533; Edwards v. Haeger, 54 
N.E. 176, 177 (Ill. 1899); New Albany & Salem R.R. Co. v. Peterson, 14 
Ind. 112 (1860); Hougan v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 35 Iowa 558 
(1872); Nourse v. Andrews, 255 S.W. 84, 86 (Ky. 1923); Chase v. 
Silverstone, 62 Me. 175, 183–84 (1873); Upjohn, 9 N.W. at 845; Ryan v. 
Quinlan, 124 P. 512, 516 (Mont. 1912); Beatrice Gas Co. v. Thomas, 59 
N.W. 925, 927–28 (Neb. 1894); Mosier v. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363 (1872); 
Bloodgood v. Ayers, 15 N.E. 433 (N.Y. 1888); Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb. 
230, 235 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855); Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 
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after Edwin Drake’s 1858 oil strike, plaintiffs brought cases dealing 
with the extraction of oil and natural gas from a common pool, and 
courts reached the same result.25 In case after case, courts “[f]aced 
 
(1861); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 528 (1855); Houston & T. C. 
Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904); Crescent Mining Co. v. Silver 
King Mining Co., 54 P. 244 (Utah 1898); Chatfield, 28 Vt. 49; Miller v. 
Black Rock Springs Imp. Co., 40 S.E. 27 (Va. 1901); Pence v. Carney, 
52 S.E. 702, 706 (W. Va. 1905). Ohio reversed the broad Frazier v. 
Brown interpretation of the Acton rule in 1984. See Cline v. Am. 
Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984). Utah altered the result 
in Crescent Mining Co. by statute. See Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P.2d 
922, 923 (Utah 1949); Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (Lexis Nexis 2012).  
Several states adopted a reasonableness regime at the outset without 
ever holding subsurface water injuries are generally damnum absque 
injuria. Cason v. Fla. Power Co., 76 So. 535 (Fla. 1917) (noting 
interferences are not actionable when they are reasonable); Bassett v. 
Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 577 (1862) (restricting “each to a 
reasonable exercise of his own right, a reasonable use of his own 
property, in view of the similar rights of others” because “[t]he rights of 
each land-owner being similar, and his enjoyment dependent upon the 
action of the other land-owners, these rights must be valueless unless 
exercised with reference to each other”); Meeker v. City of E. Orange, 74 
A. 379 (N.J. 1909) (rejecting the “English rule” of property in 
underground resources and adopting the “reasonable user” doctrine). As 
most jurisdictions that follow Acton provide for actions against 
unreasonable users of subsurface resource pools, the difference in the 
Acton rejecting jurisdictions is not clear. The West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals in adopting the reasonableness regime stated that it 
“constitutes . . . a qualification of the early rule [rather] than an 
announcement of a new rule.” Pence, 52 S.E. at 706. Accordingly, the 
states that adopted the reasonableness regime at the outset, like West 
Virginia, arguably in one stroke adopted the rule of Acton and then 
qualified it, or perhaps adopted two rules that are not actually in 
conflict with one another. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
25. People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59, 60 (Ind. 1892) (“So far as this 
suit seeks to enjoin the appellants from exploding nitroglycerin in their 
gas well, upon the ground that it will increase the flow of the gas to the 
injury of the appellee, it cannot, in our opinion, be sustained.”); Kelly v. 
Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897); Gruger v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 135 P.2d 485, 488–89 (Okla. 1943) (affirming dismissal 
of action seeking compensation for oil withdrawn from beneath 
plaintiff’s land); Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. 
1948) (holding landowners may “appropriate the oil and gas that have 
flowed from adjacent lands without the consent of the owner of those 
lands, and without incurring liability to him for drainage”); Powers v. 
Union Drilling, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va. 1995) (holding drainage of 
oil and gas not actionable at common law). Surprisingly, the Texas 
Supreme Court had no occasion to apply Acton to oil and gas until 
decades after the adoption of Texas’s statutory regime for regulating oil 
and gas. 210 S.W.2d 558. The court had only observed that the rule 
applied in earlier cases not dealing with disputes between neighbors. 
See, e.g., Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 
1935) (“The common law recognizes no well spacing regulations. At 
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with the prospect of a resource [they] could not see and [industrial] 
activities with widespread affects” felt themselves incapable of 
resolving the disputes and providing meaningful redress and accordingly 
held interferences damnum absque injuria.26 
 
common law the landowner can drill an unlimited number of wells for 
oil and gas upon his land. . . . The adjoining landowner cannot complain 
if wells are drilled near his boundary line. Under this rule the only way 
the landowner can protect himself is to drill offset wells.”); Stephens 
Cnty. v. Mid-Kan. Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. 1923) 
(“Ultimate injury from the net results of drainage, where proper diligence 
is used, is altogether too conjectural to form the basis for the denial of a 
right of property in that which is not only plainly as much realty as any 
other part of the earth’s contents, but realty of the highest value to 
mankind . . . .”). Many oil and gas producing states have no cases 
applying Acton to oil and gas, probably due to the enactment of 
regulatory regimes before state supreme courts had occasion to address 
the issue in a purely common law fashion. This includes Idaho, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming. As for Pennsylvania, see infra 
text accompanying notes 67–71 and 90–108. As for Kentucky, see infra 
text accompanying notes 41–54 and 75. As for Indiana, see infra text 
accompanying notes 76–81. 
26. Cheren, supra note 13, at 593. This feeling, arising due to the hidden 
character of subsurface resources, led courts not only to limit actions for 
nuisance, but to adopt limiting constructions of servitudes as well. For 
example, one decision narrowly interpreted a conveyance that included 
right to draw water in the amount “now used” from a particular well so 
as to not make actionable the subsequent construction of another well 
that diminished the water in the well described in the conveyance below 
the amount suggested by the words “as now used.” Davis v. Spaulding, 
32 N.E. 650, 650 (Mass. 1892). The court observed: 
It is impossible to know in what direction percolating water 
finds its way into a well; perhaps only through the bottom of the 
excavation, and perhaps through the surrounding as well as the 
subjacent land. Its ways of approach, and its amount, vary with 
the operation of obscure natural causes, not controllable by the 
owner of the land through which it passes. If the grant of such a 
well, or of the privilege of drawing water from it, were held to 
impose an obligation upon all the land from which the well 
might derive a supply of water, the burden would be very 
indefinite, uncertain, and shifting, and would tend, without any 
adequate corresponding benefit, to prevent the improvement of 
land by buildings, and its use for mining, quarrying, and many 
other useful purposes. . . . An intention to subject a large territory 
to such a burden for the benefit of a single house lot is not to be 
lightly presumed. 
Id. at 652. Samuel Hamilton, one of John Steinbeck’s great heroes, 
seems to know something that the court did not: 
He dismounted, handed his reins to Adam, and untied his forked 
wand. He took the forks in his two hands and walked slowly, his 
arms out and stretched before him and the wand tip up. His 
steps took a zigzag course. Once he frowned and backed up a 
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The only instances in which damnum absque injuria was not 
applied to underground interferences with water supplies were instances 
in which the interference itself became visible. Thus, some courts 
created a cause of action for interference with rights in a common pool 
when the subsurface water was polluted.27 This relaxation of the 
damnum approach is quite sensible because the presence of pollutants 
removes the hidden character of subsurface resource pools. When an 
unnatural pollutant traceable to a surface activity is found in a well, 
judges face no incapacity to trace cause and effect, determine liability, 
and afford a remedy by injunction. 
Other courts refused to apply the damnum approach to interferences 
with so-called percolating waters, as opposed to “[u]nderground currents 
of water, flowing in defined channels,” though this result seems to 
conflict with the spirit of Acton itself.28 This may be justified in that 
so-called subsurface streams are by their nature not so hidden as to 
limit judicial capacity.29 Indeed, many courts that recognize a 
 
few steps, then shook his head and went on. Adam rode slowly 
along behind, leading the other horse.  
Adam kept his eyes on the stick. He saw it quiver and then jerk 
a little, as though an invisible fish were tugging at a line. 
Samuel’s face was taut with attention. He continued on until the 
point of the wand seemed to be pulled strongly downward 
against his straining arms. He made a slow circle, broke off a 
piece of sagebrush, and dropped it on the ground. He moved 
well outside his circle, held up his stick again, and moved inward 
toward his marker. As he came near it, the point of the stick 
was drawn down again. Samuel sighed and relaxed and dropped 
his wand on the ground. “I can get water here,” he said. “And 
not very deep. The pull was strong, plenty of water.” 
“Good,” said Adam. 
John Steinbeck, East of Eden 165 (Viking 2003) (1952). 
27. Swift & Co. v. Peoples Coal & Oil Co., 186 A. 629, 632 (Conn. 1936); 
Beatrice, 59 N.W. at 927–28; Branch v. W. Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 
267, 274 (Utah 1982).  
28. Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303, 308 (1871); Tampa Waterworks Co. v. 
Cline, 20 So. 780, 783 (Fla. 1896); Willis v. City of Perry, 60 N.W. 727, 
729 (Iowa 1894); Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150 (Me. 1999); 
Bloodgood, 15 N.E. at 434; Wheatley, 25 Pa. at 531; Logan Gas Co. v. 
Glasgo, 170 N.E. 874, 876 (Ohio 1930); Canada v. City of Shawnee, 64 
P.2d 694, 699 (Okla. 1937); Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 139 S.E. 
308, 311 (Va. 1927). 
29. See Wheatley, 25 Pa. at 532 (“When the filtrations are gathered into 
sufficient volume to have an appreciable value, and to flow in a clearly 
defined channel, it is generally possible to see it, and to avoid diverting 
it without serious detriment to the owner of the land through which it 
flows.”); Haldeman v. Bruckhardt, 45 Pa. 514, 521 (1863) (“The defined 
watercourses [discussed in Wheatley] which a man may not divert to the 
hurt of an inferior proprietor, are not the hidden streams of which the 
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distinction between percolating waters and water flowing in defined 
channels limit this recognition to cases in which the existence and 
nature of the water course is known to or determinable by the 
defendant from above ground before engaging in the conduct plaintiff 
complains of. 
Contrary to the ferae naturae view, courts did not mention the 
law of wild animals in reaching these results, which were based simply 
on the court’s inability to accurately know how surface activities were 
affecting the common pool. The case most often cited as the origin of 
the rule of capture and the ferae naturae analogy, Westmoreland & 
Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, had nothing to do with the 
diversion of a common pool resource from one surface owner to 
another.30 That case, although often quoted by commentators who 
advance the capture theory, involved a dispute between two lessors of 
the mineral rights to the same piece of land, and the court had to 
determine whether the first lessor had rights that were superior to the 
rights of the second lessor. The court held in favor of the first lessor, 
even though the first lessor did not have possession of the gas itself. 
The court’s reference to wild animals was not to justify its holding 
(which was based on the notion that the surface owner had rights in 
the common pool even before the resources were extracted) but to 
contrast the situation when rival claimants to the same right had to 
have possession (capture) before they could enforce their rights.31 The 
 
owner of the soil through which they pass can have no knowledge until 
they have been discovered by excavations made in the exercise of his 
rights of property. There are known streams to which, if the lower 
proprietor has any rights, they are perceptible, and require no sub-
surface exploration before their course can be defined.”). 
30. See, e.g., Dukeminier et al., supra note 2, at 36 (“The resources, one 
early case said, ‘may be classed by themselves, if the analogy be not too 
fanciful, as minerals ferae naturae. In common with animals, and unlike 
other minerals, they have the power and the tendency to escape without 
the volition of the owner. . . . They belong to the owner of the land, and 
are part of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are subject to his 
control; but when they escape, and go into other land, or come under 
another’s control, the title of the former owner is gone. Possession of the 
land, therefore, is not necessarily possession of the gas. If an adjoining, 
or even a distant, owner, drills his own land, and taps your gas, so that 
it comes into his well and under his control, it is no longer yours, but 
his.’ ”) (quoting Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18 
A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889) (alteration in original)). 
31. The holding in Westmoreland is only that drilling leases are enforceable in 
equity. A landowner leased a parcel “for the sole and only purpose of 
drilling and operating wells” to one party and subsequently leased the 
land to others who intended to drill and operate wells. 18 A. at 724. The 
original lessor sought an injunction but was denied by the lower court on 
the grounds that the lessor did not have possession of property sufficient 
to entitle the lessor to the equitable remedy of an injunction. Thus, the 
lessor would only be able to pursue a case at law for damages. Id. The 
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other prominent references to wild animals in oil and gas cases, those 
determining the constitutionality of oil and gas regulations, pointedly 
contradict the view that courts treated subsurface resource pools as 
commons property.32 
Contrary to the ad coelum view, common law courts did not hold 
that draining resources from underneath a neighbor’s land is privileged. 
The invocation of damnum absque injuria does not privilege exploitation 
but rather renders interference judicially noncognizable. In Acton and 
the American cases that followed, the activities that negatively 
affected subsurface resources were not limited to extraction from the 
same subsurface pool.33  
  
 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and held that the lessor did have 
sufficient possession to support equitable remedies because the lessor had 
drilled a well and had the immediate ability to remove gas. The court 
analogized subsurface resource pools to wild animals only for the limited 
proposition that the degree of possession required to entitle the holder of 
an interest in water, oil, and gas to equitable remedies was less than the 
degree required if the resource were solid minerals. Id. at 725. 
32. See discussion infra Part III (showing Supreme Court recognition that 
oil and gas are, unlike wild animals, not commons property for 
constitutional purposes). 
33. Brown & Bros. v. Illius, 27 Conn. 84, 94 (1858) (holding pollution of 
well caused by the transmission of pollutants produced in the course of 
industrial manufacturing by way of subsurface currents and streams 
damnum absque injuria because “plaintiffs could no more complain of 
the inconvenience to them” caused thereby “than they could if the 
defendant had dug a well on his own land and thereby dried up a well 
on that of the plaintiffs”), overruled in part by Swift & Co. v. Peoples 
Coal & Oil Co., 186 A. 629 (Conn. 1936) (finding an exception to the 
holding of Brown & Bros. for pollutants transmitted by percolating 
waters as opposed to subsurface currents and streams and overruling the 
distinction, effectively holding subsurface transmission of pollutants by 
any means is no longer damnum absque injuria.); United Fuel Gas Co. 
v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Ky. 1953) (reversing judgment of 
“damages for the contamination of a water well charged to have been 
caused by a nearby gas well” because the injury is damnum absque 
injuria); Upjohn v. Bd. of Health, 9 N.W. 845, 848 (Mich. 1881) 
(holding corruption of subsurface water caused by burial of the dead not 
actionable); Logan Gas, 170 N.E. at 876 (holding drying up of stream 
caused by drilling of gas well damnum absque injuria); Rose v. Socony-
Vacuum Corp., 173 A. 627, 632 (R.I. 1934) (holding “contamination of 
percolating waters” by the operation of neighboring refinery was 
damnum absque injuria), abrogated by Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition 
Co., Inc., 682 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1996); Couch v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 139 
S.E. 314, 316 (Va. 1927) (holding drying up of well caused by collapse of 
neighbor’s mine damnum absque injuria); Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 
(1855) (holding diminishment of percolating water following into 
reservoir caused by the diversion of brook damnum absque injuria). 
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Furthermore, injuries to enjoyment of surface water suffered when 
a neighbor drained subsurface water have been held not damnum 
absque injuria.34 Flooding neighboring land is actionable even if the 
water crosses the property line below ground.35 And courts that have 
gone astray and held exploitation of subsurface resource pools 
privileged have reached unjustifiable results.36 The damnum absque 
injuria result is predicated on the notion that if one’s activities 
interfered with another’s use of a subsurface resource pool, all or 
nearly all of the chain of cause and effect of the interference (that is, 
the injury) is hidden from observation. This predicate is based on the 
nature of the interfered-with resource not the complained-of activity. 
Thus, the common law did not protect any and all exploitation of 
subsurface resource pools; rather it limited recognition of causes of 
actions claiming interference with subsurface resource pools hidden 
from view. 
  
 
34. City of Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588, 612 (1881) (holding that a city 
must compensate a mill owner for the loss of natural surface stream flow 
caused by the city digging a percolation-fed well on nearby land); Strait 
v. Brown, 16 Nev. 317, 321 (1881) (holding actionable the diminishment 
of a creek caused by diversion of the creek’s source, a spring, even 
though the creek received water “by some subterranean means”); Smith 
v. City of Brooklyn, 54 N.E. 787, 788 (N.Y. 1899) (“That the diversion 
and diminution of the [surface] stream were caused by arresting and 
collecting the underground waters, which, percolating through the earth, 
fed the stream, does not affect the question.”). But see Ellis v. Duncan, 
21 Barb. 230, 235 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855) (holding that the damage 
resulting from “the interruption of the sub-surface supplies of a stream 
. . . is not the subject of legal redress”); Miller v. Black Rock Springs 
Imp. Co., 40 S.E. 27, 31 (Va. 1901) (holding interception and diversion 
of subsurface source of neighbor’s stream damnum absque injuria). 
35. Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520 (1866) (holding defendant liable for 
flooding his neighbor’s land by damming an adjacent surface stream, 
even though the flooding occurred via percolation through the soil 
rather than the overflow of natural banks). 
36. See Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 248 A.2d 106, 116 (Md. 1968) (holding 
threats to subsidence of land caused by neighboring extraction of 
subsurface water not actionable); see also discussion infra Part II. 
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C. Responses to the Migratory Nature of Subsurface Resource Pools: 
Malicious Interference, Waste, and Unreasonable Exploitation  
Although an action for interference with rights in subsurface 
resource pools could not be maintained because the resources were 
hidden, the migratory character of subsurface resource pools led common 
law courts to recognize causes of action that coordinated the decision 
making of those exploiting the same subsurface resource pool. The 
common law courts recognized actions for (1) malicious interference, 
(2) waste, and (3) unreasonable exploitation. The recognition of these 
causes of actions reflect the shared nature of subsurface resource 
pools. These actions coordinate the activities of surface owners that 
impact the shared resource, and this judicial coordination exemplifies 
the shared property paradigm. This Section summarizes the common 
law recognition of these actions and their grounding in the migratory 
character of subsurface resource pools. The import of these common 
law rules, as well as their relationship with the Acton-type decisions 
discussed in the previous section, is discussed in Part II. 
The prohibitions against malicious interference, waste, and 
unreasonable exploitation of subsurface resource pools require 
reasonable behavior by those with a shared interest in the resource. 
The first two obligations give rise to a cause of action and a remedy 
whenever they are found to exist. The determination that the action 
is unreasonable is built into the concept of malicious interference or 
waste, and liability for waste and malicious interference is not 
dependent on local circumstances.37 Unreasonable exploitation, the 
third category of actionable conduct, encompasses decisions that are 
actionable only if they are determined to be unreasonable under all 
the circumstances of the particular subsurface resource pool. The 
obligations to avoid malicious interference and waste are often 
codified in statute and are applied more uniformly by states than the 
prohibition on unreasonable exploitation. In many jurisdictions, there 
are further variations in the treatment of water as opposed to oil and 
gas.38 Waste and malicious interference are actionable in nearly every 
state and for all three subsurface pooled resources—water, oil, and gas. 
 
37. The impossibility of reasonable waste under the common law is the 
result of the technical definition of common law waste. Waste could be 
defined as any instance of less than full utilization, but this is not how it 
is defined under the common law. Rather, waste is dissipation without 
any utilization at all. Thus, properly considered, the statutory 
prohibitions on obtaining oil without capturing natural gas emanating 
from the wellhead are not common law waste restrictions but are better 
classified under the category of unreasonable exploitation. 
38. The most significant variation is that the sale of water outside of the 
locality may constitute unreasonable exploitation even if the sale of oil 
and gas outside of the locality would not be. 
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1. Malicious Interference with Subsurface Resource Pools 
Courts recognize a cause of action for malicious interference with 
subsurface resource pools because the migratory character of subsurface 
resources means that one surface owner can too easily impair another 
surface owner’s ability to enjoy the pool.39 Malicious interference is 
any action with the unjustified purpose and effect of reducing 
another’s enjoyment of a subsurface resource pool.40 
For example, in the course of its lengthy legal and competitive 
rivalry with the Kentucky Heating Company, the Louisville Gas Co., 
through its agents, formed the Calor Oil & Gas Company and had it 
acquire several gas leases in the field that supplied the Kentucky 
Heating Company. As the court said, “[O]ne of their objects in getting 
the leases and organizing the Calor Oil & Gas Company was to 
interfere with the supply of [Kentucky Heating Company], and thus 
cripple it as a rival of the Louisville Gas Company.”41 To this end, the 
Calor Oil & Gas Company drilled several producing gas wells on its 
leases in the field.42 As the aim was simply to exhaust the Kentucky 
Heating Company’s supply of gas, the Calor Oil & Gas Company 
might simply have flared the gas at the wellhead, but this strategy 
was foreclosed by a Kentucky statute forbidding the waste of natural 
gas.43 Accordingly, Calor Oil & Gas Company constructed a lampblack 
factory that, because gas is burned to produce lampblack, provided a 
defense for the burning of the gas.44 The putative lampblack factory 
 
39. See Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164, 177 (1882) (holding that allegations of 
“digging of a well . . . ‘for the mere, sole and malicious purpose’ of 
cutting off the sources of the spring and injuring the plaintiff, and not 
for the improvement of his own estate” are actionable but not borne out 
by the evidence); Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 72 N.E. 
849, 852 (Ind. 1904) (holding spite water well and pump actionable); 
Louisville Gas Co. v. Ky. Heating Co. (Louisville Gas I), 77 S.W. 368, 
369–70 (Ky. 1903) (owner of the soil “cannot be allowed deliberately to 
waste the supply for the purpose of injuring his neighbor. . . . Every 
owner may bore for gas on his own ground, and may make a reasonable 
use of it; but he may not wantonly injure or destroy the reservoir 
common to him and his neighbor”). 
40. This definition distinguishes causes of action for activities that have no 
other effect than to reduce the enjoyment of a subsurface resource pool 
without any finding or allegation of malicious intent. In some of these 
cases, the action is clearly undertaken with such a purpose, but the 
court declines, for prudential reasons or otherwise, to inquire into the 
motives of the actor while nevertheless finding the action unlawful. 
41. Louisville Gas I, 77 S.W. at 369. 
42. Id.  
43. Ky. Stat. §§ 3910–14 (Barbour & Carroll 1894); see Commonwealth v. 
Trent, 77 S.W. 390 (Ky. 1903) (discussing the waste statute). 
44. Louisville Gas I, 77 S.W. at 369.  
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was protected by a twelve-foot-high fence and armed guards who 
frequently discharged firearms to “deter the neighbors from coming 
about.”45 Run by a lawyer who “knew nothing of the manufacture of 
lampblack,” the factory produced “300 pounds of lampblack, worth 4 
cents a pound” in five months of operation while at the same time 
burning 90 million cubic feet of natural gas.46  
The operation achieved its intended effect of diminishing the 
Kentucky Heating Company’s supply: the gas pressure in the field 
was reduced from sixty pounds to thirty pounds.47 The Kentucky 
Heating Company brought suit to enjoin the intentional disruption of 
its exploitation of the gas field, and this litigation produced two 
decisions by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.48 In the first decision the 
court affirmed an injunction against the malicious interference: 
[T]he common law affords an ample remedy for a wrong like 
this. While natural gas is not subject to absolute ownership, the 
owner of the soil must, in dealing with it, use his own property 
with due regard to the rights of his neighbor. He cannot be 
allowed deliberately to waste the supply for the purpose of 
injuring his neighbor. . . . The gas under the ground may go 
wherever it will, but the defendants cannot be allowed to draw 
off the gas from under the plaintiff’s lands simply for the 
purpose of injuring it, for the plaintiff’s lands are thus 
clandestinely sapped, and their value impaired. These principles 
have often been applied in the case of underground waters, and 
we see no reason why the same rule should not apply to natural 
gas. . . . The doctrine that an act which is legal in itself, and 
violates no legal right, cannot be made actionable on account of 
the motive which induced it, has no application, because the 
acts of the defendants in wasting the gas violated the plaintiff’s 
legal rights. Both the parties drew gas from the same reservoir. 
It was incumbent on each to exercise his right so as not to 
injure the other unnecessarily. If one wasted all of the gas from 
the reservoir, there would be nothing left for the other. Every 
owner may bore for gas on his own ground, and may make a 
reasonable use of it; but he may not wantonly injure or destroy 
the reservoir common to him and his neighbor.49 
 
45. Id.  
46. Id. 
47. Id.  
48. Id. at 370 (affirming injunction against the operation of the lampblack 
factory); Louisville Gas Co. v. Ky. Heating Co. (Louisville Gas II), 111 
S.W. 374, 375 (K.Y. 1908) (determining the proper calculation of 
damages for the malicious interference). The Kentucky Court of Appeals 
was the highest court in Kentucky prior to 1976. 
49. Louisville Gas I, 77 S.W. at 369–70. 
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In the second decision the court considered the proper calculation of 
damages for the malicious interference and once again set out the 
legal obligations between surface owners: 
The right of the surface owners to take gas from subjacent fields 
or reservoirs is a right in common. There is no property in the 
gas until it is taken. Before it is taken it is fugitive in its nature, 
and belongs in common to the owners of the surface. The right 
of the owners to take it is without stint; the only limitation 
being that it must be taken for a lawful purpose and in a 
reasonable manner. Each tenant in common is restricted to a 
reasonable use of this right, and each is entitled to the natural 
flow of the gas from the subjacent fields, and any unlawful 
exercise of this right, by any tenant in common, which results in 
injury to the natural right of any other tenant or surface owner, 
is an actionable wrong.50 
In this pair of decisions, the court’s recognition of an action for 
malicious interference was grounded in the migratory character of 
subsurface natural gas. In the first, the court noted that “gas under 
the ground may go wherever it will” and if one surface owner “wasted 
all of the gas from the reservoir, there would be nothing left for the 
other.”51 And in the second the court noted that gas underground “is 
fugitive in nature” and that surface owners exploit the “natural flow 
of the gas from subjacent fields.”52 Under these circumstances, the 
court held that surface owners “may not wantonly injure or destroy 
the reservoir common to him and his neighbor”53 and a surface 
owner’s unlawful exercise of the right to exploit gas that “results in 
 
50. Louisville Gas II, 111 S.W. at 376. As to the calculation of damages, the 
court explained:  
The damage sustained is only that which results from an 
improper interference with the natural flow of the gas in the 
wells and pipes of another. It is not the value of the gas at the 
point of distribution, or at any point where it enters artificial 
conduits, but the value in money for the diminution of the natural 
flow of the gas at the wells, directly and independently of all 
other causes attributable to the wrongs complained of. In other 
words, the measure of damages is the difference in money, at the 
point where taken, between the value of the natural flow and 
that of the diminished flow, directly and independently of all 
other causes, attributable to the wrong. 
 
Id. at 376–77. The court also affirmed that punitive damages may be 
awarded. Id. at 377. 
51. Louisville Gas I, 77 S.W. at 369–70. 
52. Louisville Gas II, 111 S.W. at 376. 
53. Louisville Gas I, 77 S.W. at 370. 
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injury to the natural right of any other tenant or surface owner, is an 
actionable wrong.”54 
While true malicious interference cases are rare, many of the state 
supreme courts that have not heard such cases have recognized a 
cause of action for malicious interference.55 
2. Waste of Subsurface Resource Pools 
Common law courts also held that, because of the migratory 
nature of subsurface resource pools, one surface owner could sue 
another surface owner for waste.56 Common law waste of subsurface 
 
54. Louisville Gas II, 111 S.W. at 376. 
55. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guar. Oil Co., 82 So. 206, 210, 211 (La. 1919) 
(observing under civil law that “[o]n the point of an owner not being 
allowed through pure spite or wantonness to do something on his 
property injurious to his neighbor, we find but one dissenting voice 
among the French law-writers and decisions” and quoting other French 
law-writers for the proposition that “[i]f it is found that an owner who 
has dug his soil has been prompted in doing so simply by the desire to 
injure his neighbor, the court can abate what has been done” (citation 
omitted)); Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 248 A.2d 106, 115 (Md. 1968) 
(declining to decide whether malicious interference with subsurface 
water is actionable because there was no “contention or proof . . . that 
there was . . . malice”); Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 447 (1870) 
(“[E]xcavations maliciously made in one’s own land, with a view to 
destroy a spring or well in his neighbor’s land, could not be regarded as 
reasonable; and there would be much ground for holding that if the 
spring or well in his neighbor’s land could be preserved without material 
detriment to the land owner making such excavations, it would be 
evidence of malice, or such negligence as to be equivalent to malice.”); 
Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 718 (Pa. 1893) (noting plaintiffs could not 
“complain of the defendants for the act of drilling the well on their land 
on any other ground than the existence of malice or negligence”); 
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 533 (1855) (“Neither the civil law nor 
the common law permits a man to be deprived of a well or spring or 
stream of water for the mere gratification of malice.”); Rose v. Socony-
Vacuum Corp., 173 A. 627, 630 (R.I. 1934) (noting landowner can 
“appropriate to its own use the percolating waters under its soil, 
providing that in so doing it was not actuated by an improper motive”); 
City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 
1955) (noting common law limitation that a surface owner “may not 
maliciously take water for the sole purpose of injuring his neighbor”). 
56. McCoy v. Ark. Natural Gas Co., 165 So. 632, 634 (La. 1936) (reversing 
dismissal of negligent waste of gas complaint because plaintiff’s 
complaint alleged the waste diminished the market value of the land); 
Higgins, 82 S. at 212 (holding under civil law that the refusal to plug an 
abandoned well may be an actionable nuisance); Stillwater Water Co. v. 
Farmer, 93 N.W. 907, 910 (Minn. 1903) (holding the digging of a trench 
that has no function other than to divert percolating waters into a city 
sewer constitutes actionable waste regardless of the trench digger’s 
intent); Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex. 1948) 
(holding “the negligent waste and destruction of petitioners’ gas and 
distillate was neither a legitimate drainage of the minerals from beneath 
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resource pools is any unreasonable act or refusal to act that 
unjustifiably exhausts the subsurface resource pool.  
In Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., the Texas Supreme Court 
recognized a cause of action for negligent waste of oil.57 Mabel, Frank, 
and Charles Elliff owned half the surface land above a “huge reservoir 
of gas and distillate,” and Clara Driscoll owned the remainder.58 The 
Elliffs leased their land and had one producing well. Driscoll engaged 
Texon Drilling to drill 466 feet east of the Elliff property. 
Unfortunately for all concerned, the Driscoll well “blew out, caught 
fire and cratered” because the Texon Drilling failed to use “drilling 
mud of sufficient weight,” causing “huge quantities of gas, distillate 
and some oil [to be] blown into the air, dissipating large quantities 
from the reservoir.”59 Over time, the “opening in the ground . . . 
gradually increased until it enveloped and destroyed” the Elliffs’ well, 
which accordingly “blew out, cratered, caught fire and burned for several 
years.”60 Justifiably incensed, the Elliffs sued and obtained a verdict 
for “$154,518.19, which included $148,548.19 for the gas and distillate, 
and $5970 for damages to the land and cattle.”61 The Court of Civil 
Appeals overturned the verdict on the ground that the majority of the 
lost gas and distillate first drained across the property line and then 
escaped through the blown out well on Driscoll’s land.62 
The Texas Supreme Court reversed. The court noted at the outset 
the migratory character of oil and gas: “[T]hese minerals will migrate 
across property lines towards any low pressure area created by 
production from the common pool.”63 The court agreed with the lower 
court that drainage of oil and gas does not generally give rise to a 
cause of action.64 But “[e]ach owner whose land overlies the basin has 
a like interest, and each must of necessity exercise his rights with 
some regard to the rights of others.”65 Accordingly, “under the common 
law, and independent of the conservation statutes,” surface owners are 
 
their lands nor a lawful or reasonable appropriation of them” and was 
therefore actionable). 
57. Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 562. 
58. Id. at 559. 
59. Id. at 559–60. 
60. Id. at 559. 
61. Id. at 560. 
62. Texon Drilling Co. v. Elliff, 210 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), 
rev’d, 210 S.W.2d 558. 
63. Elliff, 210 S.W. at 561 (Tex. Sup. Ct.). 
64. Id. at 562 (“[T]here is no liability for reasonable and legitimate drainage 
from the common pool.”). 
65. Id. 
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“legally bound to use due care to avoid the negligent waste or 
destruction of the minerals imbedded in [neighboring] oil and gas-
bearing strata.”66 
Similarly, Pennsylvania recognizes a cause of action for waste of 
the subsurface resource pools that results from negligence.67 In Hague 
v. Wheeler, two landowners who were recovering and marketing gas 
from a subsurface pool sought and received an injunction from a lower 
court against a third landowner who had tapped the pool, preventing 
the third landowner from releasing the gas into the air.68 The third 
landowner had been unable to market the gas while the other two 
were successfully doing so.69 Releasing the gas “reduce[d] ultimately 
the flow of gas from” the other two landowners’ wells.70 The 
landowners claimed that releasing rather than capturing the gas 
unreasonably harmed them by diminishing the productivity of their 
own wells without any offsetting benefit to the landowner who 
released the gas into the air; he released the gas only to get leverage 
over the other two landowners (the bill averred the third landowner 
had threatened to release the gas unless he received payment from the 
other two landowners). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the 
lower court’s grant of an injunction and held that venting gas could 
not constitute an actionable nuisance simply because it diminished a 
common pool without benefiting the venting land owner, it did so 
because it found from the circumstances of the case that the gas was 
vented in “good faith” and not “with malice, or in negligence.”71 
Common law waste cases are rare (albeit less rare than malicious 
interference cases) in part because many states statutorily prohibit 
waste of subsurface resource pools.72 Some state supreme courts that 
 
66. Id. at 563. 
67. See Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 719–20 (Pa. 1893). 
68. Id. at 718. 
69. Id. at 718–19.  
70. Id. at 719.  
71. Id. at 718. 
72. The following state statutes prohibit the waste of both oil and gas 
unless otherwise noted: Ala. Code § 9-17-11 (2001); Alaska Stat. 
§ 31.05.095 (2012); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-503 (2000); Ark. 
Code Ann. § 15-72-105 (2009); Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 3300, 3500 
(West 2001) (gas); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-107 (2012); Fla. Stat. 
§ 377.20 (2012); Ga. Code Ann. § 12-4-53 (2012); Idaho Code Ann. 
§ 47-316 (2003); 225 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 725 / 1.1 (West 2007); 
Iowa Code § 458A.3 (2013); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-601 (2005) (oil); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 353.520 (West 2011); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 30:2 (2007); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.61504 (West 1999); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 53-3-3; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 259.060 (2000); Mont. 
Code Ann. § 82-11-121 (2011); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 70-2-2 (1995); N.Y. 
Envtl. Conserv. Law § 71-1305 (McKinney 1997); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
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have not been faced with waste cases have indicated that they would 
recognize a common law action for waste if the appropriate case came 
before them.73  
3. Unreasonable Exploitation of Subsurface Resource Pools 
Finally, because subsurface resource pools are migratory, common 
law courts have recognized a cause of action for unreasonable 
exploitation of subsurface resource pools.74 Courts have recognized 
 
§ 113-390 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 38-08-03 (2004); Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 1509.20 (West 2012) (requiring “every reasonable 
precaution in accordance with the most approved methods of operation 
to stop and prevent waste of oil or gas”); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, 
§§ 236, 271 (West 2011); 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 404 (West 1996); 
Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 85.045 (West 2011); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 40-6-3 (LexisNexis 2010); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 29 § 521 (2008); Wash. 
Rev. Code § 78.52.130 (2012) (same); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-102 
(2011). 
73. See, e.g., Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 248 A.2d 106, 115 (Md. 1968) 
(declining to decide whether waste of subsurface water is actionable 
because there was “no contention or proof . . . that there was . . . 
waste”); Village of Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb. 316, 320 (N.Y. Gen. 
Term 1867) (Boardman, J.) (“No person can wantonly and maliciously 
cut off on his own land the underground supply of a neighbors’ spring or 
well without any purpose of usefulness to himself.”). 
74. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 771 (Cal. 1903) (“The doctrine of 
reasonable use . . . affords some measure of protection to property now 
existing, and greater justification for the attempt to make new 
developments. It limits the right of others to such amount of water as 
may be necessary for some useful purpose in connection with the land 
from which it is taken.”); Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil 
Syndicate, 76 P.2d 167, 174 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938) (“The common 
supply, or common right, or correlative right is expressly limited to the 
right of each individual surface owner to take from the oil strata lying 
beneath his properties, oil, gas, and other hyrdrocarbons intercepted by 
wells sunk beneath his own property, in such a manner as not to 
commit waste.”); Cason v. Fla. Power Co., 76 So. 535, 536 (Fla. 1917) 
(“[E]ach landowner is restricted to a reasonable use of his property as it 
affects subsurface waters passing to or from the land of another.”); 
Mfrs.’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Ind. Natural Gas & Oil Co., 57 N.E. 912 (Ind. 
1900) (holding suit for injunction against the use of a pump and other 
artificial means to increase the flow of natural gas stated a cause of 
action); Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 163 N.W. 109 (Mich. 1917) 
(affirming damages award for reduction in water supply caused by 
defendant municipality’s operation of water pump); Erickson v. 
Crookston Waterworks, Power & Light Co., 111 N.W. 391, 395 (Minn. 
1907) (holding actionable the defendant’s use of “artificial force in 
pumping the basin of supply to a low level,” which “deprive[d] the 
plaintiff of pure water provided in the natural use of his artesian well” 
and thereby “indirectly compel[led] him to buy from” the defendant); 
Olson v. City of Wahoo, 248 N.W. 304, 308 (Neb. 1933) (holding “the 
owner of land . . . cannot extract and appropriate” subterranean waters 
“in excess of a reasonable and beneficial use upon the land which he 
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owns, especially if such use is injurious to others who have substantial 
rights to the waters” and further that “if the natural underground 
supply is insufficient for all owners, each is entitled to a reasonable 
proportion of the whole”); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 
577 (1862) (holding “any interference by one land-owner with the 
natural drainage, injurious to the land of another, and not reasonable, is 
unjustifiable” and therefore actionable); Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic 
Gas Co., 87 N.E. 504, 507–08 (N.Y. 1909) (holding use of “pumps and 
other apparatus for the purpose of accelerating and increasing the flow 
of subterranean percolating waters and gas through deep wells” may 
constitute “unreasonable and improper conduct” for which plaintiff has 
“sufficient cause for appeal to, and relief by, a court of equity”); Forbell 
v. City of New York, 58 N.E. 644 (N.Y. 1900) (holding use of wells and 
pumping station to withdraw and market large quantities of water 
thereby lowering the underground water is actionably unreasonable); 
Rouse v. City of Kinston, 123 S.E. 482, 492 (N.C. 1924) (observing 
“[w]ater is a fluid, mobile, unstable” and affirming judgment for 
unreasonably withdrawing large quantities of water from deep wells and 
transmitting by pipe to customers thereby drying up the wells on a 
neighboring parcel); Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324, 
327 (Ohio 1984) (adopting reasonable use doctrine for “the resolution of 
ground water conflicts”); Canada v. City of Shawnee, 64 P.2d 694, 696 
(Okl. 1936) (holding pumping “[e]normous volumes of water . . . from 
under the lands of the defendant and of plaintiffs” for transport by 
pipeline to customers thereby drying up “the wells on all of plaintiffs’ 
lands” actionably unreasonable); Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 
14 A.2d 87, 90 (Pa. 1940) (holding “the diversion or sale to others away 
from the land” of subsurface water that “impairs the supply of a spring 
or well on the property of another . . . is not for a ‘lawful purpose’ 
within the general rule concerning percolating waters, but constitutes an 
actionable wrong for which damages are recoverable”); Horne v. Utah 
Oil Ref. Co., 202 P. 815, 817–18 (Utah 1921) (holding that pumping 
large quantities of water from artisanal basin “to be conducted and 
conveyed away to [defendant’s] oil refinery beyond the boundaries of 
[the] artesian district, there to be used for commercial and 
manufacturing purposes” is actionably unreasonable); Pence v. Carney, 
52 S.E. 702, 706 (W. Va. 1905) (holding “unreasonable and 
nonbeneficial use” of subsurface water actionable, but pumping and 
wasting of waters that is “merely temporary, and done in good faith, for 
the purpose of completing the well for legitimate use” is not 
unreasonable and nonbeneficial use); State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., 
Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 351 (Wis. 1974) (holding the cause of 
unreasonable harm through lowering the water table or reducing 
artesian pressure by withdrawing subsurface water actionable). The 
opinion in Katz v. Walkinshaw notes that its holding might or might not 
properly be applied to oil in another case. 74 P. at 772–73. The holding 
in Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate can also be 
explained by the doctrine of trespass. 6 P.2d 167. The Maryland Court 
of Appeals has expressly reserved the unreasonable exploitation 
question. Finley, 248 A.2d at 113–15 (Md. 1968) (declining to decide 
whether unreasonable exploitation of subsurface water is actionable 
because a quarrying company’s removal of subsurface water using a 
pump is not unreasonable and there was “no contention or proof . . . 
that there was any . . . other unreasonable use”). 
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actions for unreasonable extraction methods, complete exhaustion of 
subsurface water, carrying off water from the land from which it is 
drawn, and sale of water. On the other hand, there are cases that hold 
or suggest unreasonable exploitation is never actionable, but we argue 
these decisions and suggestions do not reflect the majority rule.75 
For example, in Manufacturers’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural 
Gas & Oil Co., suppliers and end users of natural gas withdrawn from 
a large reservoir sought to enjoin the Indiana Natural Gas & Oil from 
“using devices for pumping, and from employing any other artificial 
process or appliance for the purpose, or having the effect of, 
increasing the natural flow of gas” flowing out of the reservoir 
through its many wells.76 Before this case, there was some indication 
such an action would not be recognized in Indiana.77 The trial court 
dismissed the action and the court of appeals affirmed.78 The Indiana 
Supreme Court reversed and held unreasonable exploitation is actionable: 
Natural gas is a fluid mineral substance, subterraneous in its origin 
and location. . . . [T]here are reasons why the right to protect it 
from entire destruction while in the ground should be exercised by 
the owners of the land who are interested in the common reservoir. 
 
75. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801 (Pa. Com. Pl. 
1906) (holding location of wells near the property line not actionable), 
aff’d per curiam, 65 A. 801 (Pa. 1907); Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 47 Pitt. 
L.J. 58 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1899) (holding use of a gas pump which 
diminished the production of adjoining landowners unless those 
landowners also employed a gas pump not actionable), aff’d per curiam, 
44 A. 1074 (Pa. 1900); Gain v. S. Penn Oil Co., 86 S.E. 883, 885 (W. 
Va. 1915) (implying in dispute between lessor and lessee over location of 
oil well that landowners may locate oil wells “near the division line”); 
United Carbon Co. v. Campbellsville Gas Co., 18 S.W.2d. 1110, 1112–14 
(Ky. 1929) (abrogating the Kentucky tenancy in common rule with 
citations to the Summers treatise and the cases it cites, especially Jones, 
by holding the use of compressor privileged without consideration of 
tenancy in common ownership of the natural gas); Drinkwine v. State, 
300 A.2d 616, 618 (Vt. 1973) (affirming dismissal of complaint asserting 
unreasonable exploitation because “no correlative rights exist between 
adjoining landowners in percolating waters”); Sipriano v. Great Spring 
Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999) (refusing to “limit the 
common-law right of a surface owner to take water from a common 
reservoir by imposing liability on landowners who ‘unreasonably’ use 
groundwater to their neighbors’ detriment.”). 
76. Mfrs.’ Gas & Oil, 57 N.E. at 91213. 
77. People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59 (Ind. 1892) (affirming grant of a 
temporary injunction against the use of nitroglycerin to initiate 
explosions aimed at increasing production not because it would 
artificially accelerate drainage of oil, as plaintiff had contended, but 
because the detonations might be hazardous to life and property). 
78. Mfrs.’ Gas & Oil, 57 N.E. at 917 (reversing judgment “with instructions 
to overrule the demurrer”). 
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. . . [T]his right ought to reside somewhere, and we are of the 
opinion that it is held, and may be exercised, by the owners of the 
land, as well as by the state. Natural gas in the ground is so far the 
subject of property rights in the owners of the superincumbent 
lands, that while each of them has the right to bore or mine for it 
on his own land, and to use such portion of it as, when left to the 
natural laws of flowage, may rise in the wells of such owner and 
into his pipes, no one of the owners of such lands has the right, 
without the consent of all the other owners, to induce an unnatural 
flow into or through his own wells, or to do any act with reference 
to the common reservoir, and the body of gas therein, injurious to, 
or calculated to destroy, it. In the case of lakes or flowing streams, 
it cannot be said that any particular part or quantity or proportion 
of the water in them belongs to any particular land or riparian 
owner; each having an equal right to take what reasonable quantity 
he will for his own use. But the limitation is upon the manner of 
taking. So, in the case of natural gas, the manner of taking must be 
reasonable, and not injurious to or destructive of the common 
source from which the gas is drawn. . . . [O]ne common owner of 
the gas in the common reservoir cannot devest all the others of 
their rights without wrongdoing. . . . [T]he common owners of the 
gas in the common reservoir, separately or together, have the right 
to enjoin any and all acts of another owner which will materially 
injure, or which will involve the destruction of, the property in the 
common fund, or supply of gas. . . . There is something in the 
nature of unity in their possession of the gas in the reservoir. . . . 
The facts stated in the complaint constitute a cause of action . . . .79 
The Indiana Supreme Court’s recognition of a cause of action for 
unreasonable exploitation was grounded in its observation that the 
surface owners have a “unity in their possession of the gas in the 
reservoir” because of the migratory nature of subsurface natural gas.80 
Because the cause of action focused on the “manner of taking,” it 
addressed activities that were not hidden (and that did not, for that 
reason, escape judicial scrutiny), and a court could assess the 
reasonableness of their impact on the shared resource.81 
In Forbell v. City of New York, New York City had installed a 
water pumping plant that it knew would drain a significant amount of 
water from under areas outside the city.82 The New York Court of 
Appeals held this unreasonable exploitation of the subsurface water 
actionable:  
79. Id. at 91517. 
80. Id. at 917. The court cites Blackstone for the “unity of possession” 
proposition. Id. (citing 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *182). 
81. Id. at 915. 
  
82. Forbell v. City of New York, 58 N.E. 644, 645 (N.Y. 1900). 
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In the cases in which the lawfulness of interference with 
percolating waters has been upheld, either the reasonableness of 
the acts resulting in the interference, or the unreasonableness of 
imposing an unnecessary restriction upon the owner’s dominion 
of his own land, has been recognized. In the absence of contract 
or enactment, whatever it is reasonable for the owner to do with 
his subsurface water, regard being had to the definite rights of 
others, he may do. He may make the most of it that he 
reasonably can. It is not unreasonable, so far as it is now 
apparent to us, that he should dig wells and take therefrom all 
the water that he needs in order to the fullest enjoyment and 
usefulness of his land as land, either for purposes of pleasure, 
abode, productiveness of soil, trade, manufacture, or for 
whatever else the land as land may serve. He may consume it, 
but must not discharge it to the injury of others. But to fit it 
up with wells and pumps of such pervasive and potential reach 
that from their base the defendant can tap the water stored in 
the plaintiff's land, and in all the region thereabout, and lead it 
to his own land, and by merchandising it prevent its return, is, 
however reasonable it may appear to the defendant and its 
customers, unreasonable as to the plaintiff and the others whose 
lands are thus clandestinely sapped, and their value impaired.83 
The New York Court of Appeals extended the holding in Forbell to a 
factually similar case in which the purpose of the pumping was to 
withdraw and market natural gas with the ancillary effect of also 
withdrawing and wasting unreasonably large quantities of water.84 
While the common law cause of action for unreasonable 
exploitation of subsurface water is widely accepted, a pair of decisions 
from Pennsylvania and one from Ohio obscure the existence of the 
cause of action for unreasonable exploitation of oil and gas.85 In Kelly 
 
83. Id. at 64546. 
84. Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 87 N.E. 504, 507–08 (N.Y. 1909) 
(holding use of “pumps and other apparatus for the purpose of 
accelerating and increasing the flow of subterranean percolating waters 
and gas through deep wells” may constitute “unreasonable and improper 
conduct” for which plaintiff has “sufficient cause for appeal to, and relief 
by, a court of equity”). 
85. Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co. 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897); Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 
47 Pitt. L.J. 58 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1899) (holding use of a gas pump which 
diminished the production of adjoining landowners unless those 
landowners also employed a gas pump not actionable), aff’d per curiam 
44 A. 1074 (Pa. 1900); Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 
Pa. 362 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1906) (holding location of wells near the property 
line not actionable), aff’d per curiam 65 A. 801 (Pa. 1907); see 1 
Summers Oil and Gas § 3:2 (3d ed. 2012) (“The Pennsylvania court in 
Jones[, 47 Pitt. L.J. 58,] refused to enjoin the defendant from operating 
a pump which was drawing oil from the plaintiff's land. Likewise the 
Pennsylvania court in Barnard[, 216 Pa. 362], and the Ohio court in 
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v. Ohio, decided in 1897, the Ohio Supreme Court explicitly rejected 
causes of action for unreasonable exploitation of oil: 
To drill an oil well near the line of one’s land cannot interfere 
with the legal rights of the owner of the adjoining lands, so long 
as all operations are confined to the lands upon which the well 
is drilled. Whatever gets into the well belongs to the owner of 
the well, no matter where it came from. In such cases the well 
and its contents belong to the owner or lessee of the land, and 
no one can tell to a certainty from whence the oil, gas, or water 
which enters the well came, and no legal right as to the same 
can be established or enforced by an adjoining landowner. The 
right to drill and produce oil on one’s own land is absolute, and 
cannot be supervised or controlled by a court or an adjoining 
landowner. . . . [I]t is intolerable that the owner of real 
property, before making improvements on his own lands, should 
be compelled to submit to what his neighbor or a court of 
equity might regard as a reasonable use of his property.86 
This was consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court’s unequivocal 
statement in a water case, Frazier v. Brown, in 1861 that “there are 
no correlative rights existing between the proprietors of adjoining 
lands.”87 But the court overruled Frazier “and all its progeny” in 
Cline v. American Aggregates Corp. after nearly a century.88 
Accordingly, Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co. may no longer be good law in Ohio 
as it is among the progeny of Frazier’s rejection of “correlative rights 
existing between the proprietors of adjoining lands.”89 
 
Kelley[, 49 N.E. 399], refused to enjoin the operation of oil wells near 
boundary lines, although the complainants contended that oil was being 
taken from their lands.” (footnotes omitted)). 
86. Kelly, 49 N.E. at 401. 
87. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 308 (1861) (quoting Chatfield v. 
Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 (1855)), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 
15 Ohio St. 3d 384, 387 (1984). The Frazier court suggested the only 
possible causes of action Ohio might recognize would be for interference 
with subsurface water motivated by “unmixed malice” and for 
interference with underground streams in well-defined channels. Id. at 
304. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted a cause of action for interference 
with underground streams in well-defined channels in 1930. Logan Gas 
Co. v. Glasgo, 170 N.E. 874 (Ohio 1930). 
88. Cline, 474 N.E.2d at 327 (“Finding th[e] reasonable use doctrine to be 
much more equitable in the resolution of ground water conflicts, this 
court overrules Frazier v. Brown . . . and all its progeny and adopts 
Section 858 of the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, as the common 
law of Ohio.”). 
89. Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 308 (quoting Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 
(1855)). 
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In Jones v. Forest Oil Co. and Barnard v. Monongahela Natural 
Gas Co. the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued per curiam 
affirmances of court of common pleas decisions rejecting challenges to 
unreasonable exploitation of oil and gas.90  
 
90. Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 44 A. 1074 (Pa. 1900) (affirming Jones v. Forest 
Oil Co., 47 Pitt. L.J. 58 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1899)); Barnard v. Monongahela 
Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801 (Pa. 1907) (affirming Barnard v. 
Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1906)). These 
were cases in equity so the appeals at the time were exclusively in the 
jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It is important to clear 
up their procedural nature, which has been greatly misstated. In both 
cases the text of the affirmed lower court decisions were set out in the 
reporter before the court’s opinion. The opinions themselves are short 
affirmances. In Jones: “Though this particular question is somewhat of a 
novelty, the principles which control it are very familiar, and perfectly 
well settled. They are well expressed in the opinion of the learned court 
below, and, on the findings of fact and conclusions of law there contained, 
we affirm the decree.” Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 44 A. 1074, 1076 (Pa. 
1900). In Barnard: “Decree affirmed on the opinion of the court below.” 
Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 803 (Pa. 1907). Yet 
commentators and courts have for some reason treated the lower court 
opinions as if they were issued by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, even 
going so far as to quote extensively from the excerpts of the lower court 
decision while citing to the Supreme Court’s per curiam affirmance. See, 
e.g., W.L. Summers, Property in Oil and Gas. 29 Yale L.J. 174, 177 
(1919) (“In another case where the question was of the right of the owner 
of an oil well to pump oil from his well regardless of injury to his 
neighbor, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania apparently realized that the 
absolute ownership doctrine in the sense of giving an absolute right to 
take could not be applied so they reverted to the theory that ‘possession 
of the land is not necessarily possession of the oil and gas,’ and concluded 
‘that the property of the owner of the lands in oil and gas is not absolute 
until it is actually within his grasp and brought to the surface.’” 
(erroneously quoting Jones, 44 A. 1074)); Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. 
Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 Envtl. 
L. 899, 911 (2005) (“In Jones v. Forest Oil Co., the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had to determine whether the rule of capture gave the 
owner the power to use a ‘gas pump’ to artificially increase production 
and cause oil to drain from underneath the adjacent owner’s land. . . . 
The court used a percolating water case to support the proposition that a 
person may capture water, and by analogy gas, by the ‘exercise of all the 
skill and invention of which man is capable.’ . . . The court used an 
analogy to the offset drilling rule by concluding that, since all oil 
operators can afford gas pump technology, the remedy does not lie in the 
courts but in the self-help of getting one's own gas pump to counter the 
alleged drainage.’” (footnote omitted) (erroneously quoting Jones, 44 A. 
1074)). In Pennsylvania, per curiam orders have no precedential effect. 
Further, when other courts and commentators treat these decisions as 
issuing directly from a state supreme court, and not just any supreme 
court, but the supreme court of the state in which Drake made his 
famous discovery, they are afforded far more persuasive authority than 
they deserve. 
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In Jones v. Forest Oil Co., a landowner operating six oil wells 
sought and initially obtained an injunction against the use of a gas 
pump by Forest Oil at a well on the adjoining tract.91 When Forest 
Oil began using the gas pump, production from three of the 
landowner’s wells was reduced.92 After the issuance of the initial 
injunction against the use of the gas pump, the production in the 
three wells increased to its former levels.93 At the conclusion of a trial, 
the court of common pleas found that gas pumps are typically 
employed in “failing and almost exhausted territory,” that “its use by 
one operator necessitates its use by others in the immediate 
neighborhood if they desire to prevent the daily production of their 
wells from being decreased,” and that “if pumps are placed on all 
wells the production of the wells is neither increased nor 
diminished.”94 As to the circumstances of the field at issue in the case, 
the court of common pleas found that “gas pumps were in use” in the 
field by others for more than one year before the Forest Oil installed 
its gas pump and “that the production of the wells” in the field had 
“largely decreased” and was at the time “almost exhausted.”95 
In determining whether to issue a permanent injunction, the court 
of common pleas questioned “to what extent an owner of oil wells 
may use mechanical devices for bringing oil to the surface. In 
operating his own wells may he use appliances which diminish the 
production of his neighbor’s wells?”96 The court of common pleas 
concluded that “the use of a gas pump by [Forest Oil] under the 
circumstances of th[e] case [was] not an unlawful act that should be 
restrained by injunction” and accordingly dismissed the bill and 
dissolved the initially issued injunction.97 The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court affirmed per curiam.98  
Despite the ultimate outcome, the decision of the court of 
common pleas suggests recognition of a cause of action for 
unreasonable exploitation. Not only did the case go to trial, the court 
issued a preliminary injunction against the use of the gas pump. The 
circumstances of the case referred to by the court are evidently the 
fact that the field depleted to a point such that it was reasonable for 
all owners to employ a gas pump. The case does not hold that using a 
 
91. Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 47 Pitt. L.J. 58 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1899). 
92. Id. at 59.  
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 60. 
98. Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 44 A. 1074 (Pa. 1900). 
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gas pump or other methods of increasing the flow of gas in wells is 
always privileged and not subject to a requirement of reasonableness. 
Even if it did, as some suggest or imply,99 its precedential and 
persuasive value for such a proposition is limited. 
In Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., Daniel and 
Elizabeth Barnard leased sixty-six acres to Monongahela Natural Gas 
for oil and gas production.100 James Barnard leased an adjoining 156-
acre parcel to Monongahela for the same purpose. Under the terms of 
the leases, each lessor would be paid royalties on gas and oil produced 
only from wells on the lessor’s land. Daniel and Elizabeth Barnard 
protested as Monongahela Natural Gas first drilled a paying well on 
James Bernard’s land only fifty-five feet from a right angle boundary 
between the parcels. In this location, the well would draw 
approximately three-fourths of the gas it produced from beneath 
Daniel and Elizabeth Barnard’s land while James would receive one 
hundred percent of the royalties. The company next drilled a well 
1,350 feet away from the first well on Daniel and Elizabeth Barnard’s 
parcel that failed to produce gas. Daniel and Elizabeth Barnard sued 
Monongahela Natural Gas for the unreasonable location of the first 
well. After fact finding, the court of common pleas purported only “to 
follow the lead of the decisions, not to qualify, explain, modify, 
overrule or reverse them,” but it issued a sweeping decision:  
If . . . the landowner drills on his own land at such a spot as 
best subserves his purposes what is the standing of the adjoining 
landowner whose oil or gas may be drained by this well? He 
certainly ought not to be allowed to stop his neighbor from 
developing his own farm. There is no certain way of ascertaining 
how much of the oil and gas that comes out of the well was 
 
99. 1 W. W. Thornton, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas (3d ed. 
1918) § 32 (citing Jones for the proposition that the “the right to pump 
[oil wells] clearly exists”); Walter L. Summers, A Treatise on the 
Law of Oil and Gas § 24, at 74 (1927) (“[A]ttempts have been made 
to stop operations on adjoining lands, on the theory that the pumping of 
oil wells, thereby producing an unnatural flow of the oil, was violative of 
complainant’s rights; but in no case has a restraint been placed upon 
the pumping of oil.” (citing Jones and Higgins Oil & Fuel)); 1 Summers 
Oil and Gas § 3:2 (3d ed. 2012) (citing Jones as an example of an 
early case that “declared that the landowner was legally privileged to 
take oil and gas even though he drained oil and gas from the lands of 
his neighbor”); Kramer & Anderson, supra note 93, at 911 (“The use of 
artificial means to increase production, and thereby increase drainage 
from across property lines, was held to be a lawful act under the rule of 
capture.”); id. at 919 n.116 (characterizing Jones as “holding that an oil 
and gas operator may use any appliances known to the trade to make 
well production as large as possible”). 
100. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362 (Pa. Com. Pl. 
1906). 
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when in situ under this farm and how much under that. What 
then has been held to be the law?—it is this, as we understand 
it, every landowner or his lessee may locate his wells wherever 
he pleases regardless of the interests of others. He may 
distribute them over the whole farm or locate them only on one 
part of it. He may crowd the adjoining farms so as to enable 
him to draw the oil and gas from them. What then can the 
neighbor do? Nothing, only go and do likewise. He must protect 
his own oil and gas. He knows it is wild and will run away if it 
finds an opening and it is his business to keep it at home. This 
may not be the best rule, but neither the legislature nor our 
highest court has given us any better. No doubt many 
thousands of dollars have been expended “in protecting lines” in 
oil and gas territory that would not have been expended if some 
rule had existed by which it could have been avoided. 
Injunction certainly is not the remedy. If so, just how far must 
the landowner be from the line of his neighbor to avoid the blow 
of “this strong arm of the law”?101 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed per curiam.102 
The Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co. decision by the 
court of common pleas is arguably without foundation. First, the court 
did not believe courts are incapable of judicial resolution of the dispute, 
indeed the court seemed to plead with the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court to reverse.103 The court noted its incapacity to “ascertain[ ] how 
much of the oil and gas that comes out of the well was when in situ 
under this farm and how much under that,” but this was unnecessary 
to the injunctive remedy sought in the case.104 And the reasonableness 
of the location does not depend on the actual proportions of drained 
oil and gas that enter the well, but rather it is a matter of whether 
the location itself has been unreasonably chosen under the 
circumstances of each case. In the case before the court, the location 
was not merely close to a boundary line, it was tucked into a corner 
of a parcel such that three fourths of the oil entering the well would 
 
101. Id. at 364–65. To its credit, the common pleas court was displeased with 
the law it announced, as revealed by the discussion of the court’s role as a 
lower court unable to declare “what ought to be the law,” the mention of 
wasted line-protecting expenditures, and the thinly veiled plea to the 
legislature and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to craft a better rule. Id. 
102. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 803 (Pa. 1907). 
103. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 364 (Pa. Com. 
Pl. 1906) (“The Supreme Court . . . may declare ‘what ought to be the 
law’ to be henceforth ‘the law,’ but the lower courts have no such 
authority.”); id. at 365 (“This may not be the best rule; but neither the 
legislature nor our highest court has given us any better.”). 
104. Id. at 365. 
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presumably draw from outside the property boundary.105 The 
unreasonableness was further compounded by the fact that the lessee 
held oil and gas rights to both of the parcels and therefore had no 
incentive to locate an offset well immediately on the other side of the 
boundary. Thus Daniel and Elizabeth Barnard could not “protect 
[their] own oil and gas” by “go[ing] and do[ing] likewise” as the court 
admonished them to.106 The court’s concluding rhetorical question, 
“just how far must the landowner be from the line of his neighbor,” is 
easily answered.107 The landowner must first attempt to enter into an 
agreement with the neighbor as to the location of the well. If the 
neighbor refuses to agree, the landowner must choose a reasonable 
location under the circumstances with the knowledge that an 
unreasonable location is actionable. This is hardly an unfortunate 
position for the landowner. If it were, the law of nuisance is always a 
hardship on those who must each and every day ask themselves just 
how little nuisance they may cause neighbors “to avoid the blow of 
‘this strong arm of the law.’ ”108 
There is no cause of action for unreasonable exploitation of 
subsurface water in Texas, but there may be a cause of action for 
unreasonable exploitation of oil and gas. The Texas Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected the cause of action for unreasonable exploitation of 
water in Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America Inc. in 1999.109 
As for oil and gas, the Texas Supreme Court stated in dicta in a 1935 
case that 
[t]he common law recognizes no well spacing regulations. At 
common law the landowner can drill an unlimited number of 
wells for oil and gas upon his land. . . . The adjoining landowner 
cannot complain if wells are drilled near his boundary line. 
Under this rule the only way the landowner can protect himself 
is to drill offset wells.110 
But there are no cases fitting this description in Texas, and it is 
undermined by language in Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co. in 1948.111 More  
105. If it were simply close to a line and not in a corner, it could be expected 
to draw no more than half the oil from beyond the boundary.  
106. Id. This suggests the lessee in such a circumstance should have an 
obligation to drill an offset well, but the common pleas court separately 
held it did not. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999). 
110. Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1935). 
111. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. 1948) (holding 
“there is no liability for reasonable and legitimate drainage from the 
common pool” (emphasis added)). 
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recently, the court rejected a cause of action for the unreasonable use of 
horizontal slickwater fracturing in Coastal Oil & Gas v. Garza Energy 
Trust. The court did not explicitly examine the reasonableness of the 
use of horizontal slickwater fracturing, but it emphasized “hydraulic 
fracturing is not optional; it is essential to the recovery of oil and gas in 
many areas, including the Vicksburg T formation in this case.”112 The 
necessity of the use of the method of exploitation is irrelevant if there is 
no requirement of reasonable exploitation. 
The status of unreasonable exploitation is also unclear under the 
civil law system of Louisiana. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has 
affirmed the right to use a pump, but in doing so observed, “All the 
operators in the oil field in question, including defendant, are using 
pumps; what good ground, then, could [one] have for denying [a 
neighbor] the right to do that same thing?”113 Perhaps the result 
would be different under the facts pled in Jones v. Forest Oil Co. The 
necessity of pumping in the particular field may be central to the 
case, as the court curiously stated at the outset that even though the 
complaint “does not allege that the underlying oil cannot be brought 
to the surface otherwise than by pumping,” this fact “is impliedly 
contained in the allegation which is made that every operator in that 
oil field is using a pump.”114 There would be no need for drawing this 
implication if it were not relevant. 
In our judgment, the door remains open for unreasonable 
exploitation of oil and gas suits in Ohio, Texas, and Louisiana. The 
potential for such an action in Pennsylvania is limited by Jones v. 
Forest Oil Co. and Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., but as 
these are per curiam affirmances with little precedential effect, the 
question of the whether one surface owner can sue another surface 
owner for unreasonable exploitation of oil and gas is still open.115 
 
112. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 
2008). 
113. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 82 So. 206, 211 (La. 1919).  
114. Id. at 207. 
115. Like Ohio, Pennsylvania recognized the unreasonable exploitation of 
subsurface water action subsequent to its decision limiting actions for 
unreasonable exploitation of oil and gas. Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring 
Water Co., 14 A.2d 87, 90 (Pa. 1940) (holding that the “diversion or 
sale to others away from the land” of subsurface water that “impairs the 
supply of a spring or well on the property of another . . . is not for a 
‘lawful purpose’ within the general rule concerning percolating waters, 
but constitutes an actionable wrong for which damages are 
recoverable”). But unlike Ohio, there was no prior precedent that 
rejected an action of unreasonable exploitation of subsurface water, thus 
the later decision cannot be said to undermine the earlier per curiam 
affirmances. The affirmances leave some inconsistency between the 
treatments of different subsurface fluids in the state, but Rothrauff 
involved conduct that has only ever been found unreasonable in water 
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II. Understanding the Law of  
Subsurface Resource Pools Through  
the Shared Property Paradigm 
As we saw in Part I, because of the migratory character of 
subsurface resources, the common law recognized actions for malicious 
interference, waste, and unreasonable exploitation. In this Part, we 
argue that these actions embody the shared property paradigm. We 
have also seen that common law courts, by invoking the doctrine of 
damnum absque injuria, limited the right of one surface owner to 
recover from another surface owner for underground, and therefore 
unseen, interferences with the resource pools underneath their 
property. Although this limited the right of each surface owner to an 
accounting from other surface owners, and thus differs from the 
shared property paradigm applicable to surface owners—such as timber 
owned by tenants in common—we argue that this deviation from the 
shared property paradigm was attributed solely to the uncertainty 
created by the hidden nature of the subsurface resource pools. 
Accordingly, we argue that the common law’s framework for 
addressing problems caused by subsurface resource pools is a coherent 
application of the shared property paradigm, taking into account the 
hidden nature of the resource. In other words, we argue that common 
law judges based subsurface resource pool decisions on a theory of 
shared property. But most scholarly discussions of these cases have 
failed to grasp this. As such, the conventional views of the common 
law of subsurface property rights are deficient because they focus on 
either individual or common ownership features of subsurface resource 
pools and fail to appreciate the actual theory that common law courts 
followed—the shared property paradigm. 
Our analysis rests on a theory that property is a social institution 
in which ownership and use rights take various forms for different 
resources. Property law addresses a basic and unavoidable social issue: 
Who ought to make decisions about resources and how ought those 
decisions be made? In an important sense, all resources are shared 
because they are the common inheritance of humankind. But society 
has found it convenient to break resources into various packages and 
to assign decision-making responsibility over those packages to 
different individuals. Sometimes the packages are assigned to 
individuals as private property, sometimes to the public as commons 
property, and sometimes to a group of individuals, as in the case of 
underground oil, gas, and water, as shared property. Each of these 
forms of property reflects a different paradigm about who makes 
 
cases. Thus, it may be that in Pennsylvania there is no cause of action 
for unreasonable well location or unreasonable method of extraction 
even for water. 
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decisions about resources and how they are made. The paradigms are 
not unrelated—the commons property paradigm, the private property 
paradigm, and the shared ownership paradigm are applications of a 
single and unified theory of property law.116 It is a functional theory 
because it posits that the function of law is to coordinate between the 
interests of free and equal people in order to address conflicts between 
them. Under this view, law should not be understood by the 
principles or rules or concepts that we normally think of as law but 
by the methods of analysis the law uses to address social problems. 
Under the commons property paradigm, we assign dominion over 
a resource to the public, allowing members of the public to make 
individual decisions about how the resource is to be used, but 
disallowing any exclusive dominion over the commons itself. Under 
this paradigm, exclusion from the commons is not allowed, while 
consumption or appropriation of the fruits of the commons is allowed. 
The commons is not “owned” by individuals in the traditional sense, 
and individuals have no right to exclude others, but the fruits of the 
commons may be appropriated, and thereafter owned by, individuals. 
An ocean is a commons; the fish in the ocean are commons property 
until captured. A meadow can be commons property, freely available 
to all until the grass in the meadow is consumed. A highway is 
commons property, free to be used by all, where consumption is 
determined by the rules of the road, and particularly by the 
obligation to be reasonable. Assigning property to the commons works 
only if society has some mechanism to insure that individual 
consumption and appropriation decisions do not decrease the long-
term value of the resource. Without a mechanism for coordinating the 
use of the commons, individual decisions will result in overuse and 
eventual depletion of the commons—the familiar “tragedy of the 
commons.” In the United States, the coordinating mechanism is 
sovereign authority over commons resources. Thus, commons 
resources are subject to the absolute control of state governments, 
and this sovereign authority over the commons is not limited by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.117 
Under the private property paradigm, we assign dominion over 
parts of the earth’s resources to private individuals, allow each 
individual to be the decision maker, and then coordinate the 
individual decisions in several ways: private agreement, private law, 
public regulation, eminent domain, and, most importantly, through 
the market. In this paradigm the right to exclude is crucial—as 
 
116. That theory is elaborated in greater detail in Peter M. Gerhart, 
Property Law and Social Cohesion (Cambridge Univ. Press 
forthcoming 2013). 
117. This is especially important in the law of subsurface resource pools, as 
noted below. See infra Part II.B.4. 
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Professor Merrill often reminds us because the right to exclude is 
what makes private arrangements and the market work.118 Assigning 
dominion to private owners works only if society has available strong 
mechanisms of coordination. Without those coordinating mechanisms 
we run into the tragedy of the anticommons: separate and 
uncoordinated decisions resulting in underutilization and waste. 
Accordingly, when we allow private owners to make decisions, we 
subject them to the coordinating mechanisms of, for example, 
nuisance law and eminent domain. One owner’s use decisions must, 
under nuisance law, reasonably account for the use decisions of her 
neighbors. If society wants to build a railroad, private decisions will 
not get the job done, so we give the government the power of eminent 
domain in order to coordinate decisions across individual owners.119 
Private decision making subject to social coordination emphasizes 
that in some larger sense all resources are shared. 
Under the shared property paradigm, we assign dominion over 
parts of the earth’s resources to more than one owner but require the 
several owners to coordinate fairly their use of the resource as a 
condition of its exploitation. In the case of subsurface resource pools, 
dominion over the resource is assigned in proportion to the resource 
underlying the surface boundaries (thus recognizing the ad coelom 
aspect of surface ownership). But exploitation of each portion of the 
 
118. Alienability is as important as the right to exclude for markets to exist, 
but it is often assumed in discussions of property. This is an ahistorical 
view, as the recognition of private property preceded the recognition of 
the right to alienate. Even today for some property, such as the human 
body, the law recognizes a right to exclude but not a right to alienate. 
This alienability question is at the heart of scores of early oil and gas 
cases and the inability to distinguish the judicial treatment of the 
alienability of oil and gas exploitation rights from the nature of the 
rights themselves. The alienability cases are collected in Part III, but as 
the questions they address are distinct, they are not used to analyze the 
nature of property paradigm that common law courts recognized in 
subsurface resource pools.  
119. The power of eminent domain recognizes that some public goods may be 
under produced without government action. Eminent domain is but one 
exercise of government power to increase production of public goods. 
Government may also delegate the power to tax those who benefit from 
the production of the public good. See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in 
Economics, 17 J.L. & Econ. 357, 367–72 (1974) (discussing such a plan 
while arguably failing to recognize the significance of the taxation 
delegation). Under another approach that was once far more frequently 
utilized, government can recognize in private individuals prescriptive 
rights to capture the public goods they generate. Thus, an individual 
who first invests in a ferry to an undeveloped island could be permitted 
to sue those who might attempt to compete with the original ferry 
owner once the island is developed. See Cheren, supra note 13, at 574 
n.74 (recounting an old English common law nuisance action filed by 
the owner of an established ferry against an upstart). 
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resource requires that the rights of each surface owner be treated 
equally, given each owner’s percentage interest in the pool, and this 
requires that decisions about exploiting the resource must take into 
account the proportionate interests of each of the owners. In effect, 
this means that sharing owners must act as single unit with respect to 
the exploitation of the pool while their benefits from that exploitation 
are divided into their proportionate shares. 
Underground resource pools fit the paradigm of shared property—
not a paradigm of commons property or private property. Given the 
highly interdependent nature of the decisions of surface owners, each 
has the right to exploit the resource pool, subject to the proportional 
and equal right of other surface owners to do the same. Equal rights 
to exploitation mean that the rights are shared, much like tenants in 
common. But unlike tenants in common, each owner does not have an 
equal right to the whole of the pool but an equal right to the owner’s 
proportional share in the value of the whole pool—the share lying 
below the owner’s land. Not only is this shared property paradigm the 
appropriate paradigm for addressing common pool resources, it is the 
paradigm that, by and large, common law courts intuitionally followed, 
even though theorists, having only the private and commons property 
paradigms to guide them, mischaracterized what courts were doing. 
A. Conventional Views Apply Private and Commons Paradigms 
The commons property and private property paradigms do not 
accurately address the social problems raised by underground resource 
pools, nor is either consistent with how common law courts actually 
addressed problems caused by subsurface resource pools. Yet those 
paradigms inform the different conventional views of the common law 
of subsurface resource pools. The ferae naturae view suggests that 
subsurface pooled resources are commons property, while the ad 
coelum view treats subsurface pooled resources as private property. 
The analytical limits of the commons and private property paradigms 
are not without consequence. The few courts that strictly follow either 
of these paradigms have reached highly problematic results.  
1. The Ferae Naturae View and Commons Property 
The conventional ferae naturae view of the common law of 
subsurface resource pools is that the resources are commons property. 
Proponents of this view claim as a historical matter that courts 
established the rule of capture for subsurface resource pools because 
the migratory character of the resource made them analogous to wild 
animals.120 But as Part I.B demonstrates, this is historically inaccurate 
 
120. Dukeminier et al., supra note 2, at 53 (suggesting that, like wild 
animals, groundwater, oil, and gas are “owned in common”); id. at 36 
(“[B]ecause ownership of wild animals had long been settled in terms of 
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because the nonliability for drainage is grounded in the hidden 
character of subsurface resource pools, not on its migratory character. 
In this Section, we carry our analysis further by demonstrating that 
the ownership of subsurface resource pools is not “determined in the 
same manner” as wild animals at all because subsurface resource pools 
are not commons property.121 
Subsurface resource pools are not commons property because the 
right to exploit the pool is available only to the surface owners rather 
than any member of the public. The court in Manufacturers’ Gas & 
Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. explains: 
Natural gas, being confined within limited territorial areas, and 
being accessible only by means of wells or openings upon the 
lands underneath which it exists, is not the subject of public 
rights in the same sense or to the same extent as animals ferae 
naturae and the like are said to be. Without the consent of the 
owner of the land, the public cannot appropriate it, use it, or 
enjoy any benefit whatever from it. This power of the owner of 
the land to exclude the public from its use and enjoyment 
plainly distinguishes it from all other things with which it has 
been compared, in the use, enjoyment, and control of which the 
public has the right to participate, and tends to impress upon it, 
even when in the ground in its natural state (at least, in a 
qualified degree), one of the characteristics or attributes of 
private property. In the case of animals ferae naturae, fish, and 
the like, this public interest is said to be represented by the 
sovereign or state. So, in the case of navigable rivers and public 
highways, the state, in behalf of the public, has the right to 
protect them from injury, misuse, or destruction.122 
If subsurface resource pools were commons property until captured 
and any member of the public could tap the pools, this would create a 
potential for a tragedy of the commons, and accordingly it would be 
necessary for the state to exert sovereign authority over subsurface 
resource pools. Fortunately, the Supreme Court recognized early on 
that subsurface resource pools are not commons property for 
constitutional purposes.123 
The implicit nationalization of oil and gas reserves is not the only 
erroneous analytical consequence that comes from applying the 
commons property paradigm to subsurface resource pools. Following 
 
the rule of capture, the courts reasoned that ownership of oil and gas 
should be determined in the same manner.”). 
121. Id. at 36. 
122. Mfrs.’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Ind. Natural Gas & Oil Co., 57 N.E. 912, 915 
(Ind. 1900).  
123. See infra Part II.B.4. 
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the conventional ferae naturae view of commons property leads to the 
erroneous and now overruled result in Hammonds v. Central Kentucky 
Natural Gas Co., which held that reinjected oil and gas returns were 
commons property.124 
2. The Ad Coelum View and Private Property 
As counterpoint to the ferae naturae and commons property view 
of subsurface resource pools, the conventional ad coelum view suggests 
that the resources are private property. Proponents of this view 
believe, as a historical matter, that courts were suggesting that because 
subsurface resource pools are “the absolute property of the owner of 
the freehold,” a land owner “is free to withdraw” the resources “at 
will” and “do with” them as the landowner “pleases regardless of the 
effect upon his neighbors.”125 Such a view is historically inaccurate on 
two counts. First, as we demonstrated in Part I.B, the common law 
never privileged exploitation of subsurface resource pools, contrary to 
a central tenant of ad coelum theory. Second, as we demonstrated in 
Part I.C, even though injuries to subsurface resource pools were 
generally considered to be damnum absque injuria, courts recognized 
actions for malicious interference, waste, and unreasonable 
exploitation. In fact, courts did not hold that subsurface resource 
pools were individually and distinctly owned by surface owners. 
If subsurface resource pools are the individuated private property 
of the surface owners, as the ad coelum view suggests, then it must be 
conceded that each individual surface owner loses ownership of water, 
oil, and gas once it migrates across the property line. Otherwise, if 
title were retained, one landowner could sue another for conversion of 
private property by causing drainage of subsurface resources. But 
even if one owner loses title once resources cross the boundary, courts 
have not held that one neighbor is immune from a suit for nuisance 
for causing a diminishment of the value of the landowner’s freehold. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court explains: 
 
124. Hammonds v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Ky. 
1934) (“[I]f in fact the gas turned loose in the earth wandered into the 
plaintiff’s land, the defendant is not liable to her for the value of the use 
of her property, for the company ceased to be the exclusive owner of the 
whole of the gas—it again became mineral ferae naturae.”), overruled by 
Tex. Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 
25 (Ky. 1987); see also Dukeminier et al., supra note 2, at 37 
(criticizing the result in Hammonds). 
125. Restatement (Second) of Torts, ch. 41, topic 4, intro. note, at 256 
(1977); see also Dukeminier et al., supra note 2, at 36–37 (noting 
that reinjection of underground resources “does not ordinarily give rise 
to liability for the use and occupation of parts of a reservoir underlying 
the land of neighbors”). 
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[If] the landowner “owns” that elusive and unstable substance, 
percolating water, beneath his land, it must likewise be true that 
the adjacent landowner is given the same with respect to that 
which underlies his land. If one owner invades the natural 
movement, placement, and percolation of such water by creating 
artificial suction with powerful motor driven pumps, it is not long 
until he is taking that water which was but a moment before 
“owned” by his neighboring landowner. We do not say that this 
is forbidden, so long as the taking is reasonable; but we do say 
that it exposes the futility of attempting to justify the complete 
exhaustion of a common supply of water on the ground that the 
landowner who has taken it all “owned” that part thereof 
underlying his land when the operations commenced. His 
neighbor likewise had an ownership.126 
Recognition of the surface owner’s absolute dominion over the subsurface 
resource pool beneath the freehold does not resolve the question of 
whether the surface owner has actionably exercised that dominion. 
Absolute ownership of private property has always been limited by 
the obligation of sic utero ut alienum laedas. The ad coelum view of 
subsurface resource pools as individuated private property requires 
not only recognition of a theory of title-loss but also a theory of 
nuisance immunity as well. The private property paradigm justifies 
neither modification, and it is therefore not the paradigm that the 
common law applied to subsurface resource pools. 
A prime example of mistaken doctrine that can be attributed to 
the application of the private property paradigm of the ad coelum 
view is that some states have wrongfully denied a cause of action 
when one neighbor extracts subsurface water that threatens subsidence 
of neighboring land. In Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., the Maryland 
Supreme Court held that the extraction of subsurface water that 
threatens to cause subsidence of neighboring land is not actionable,127 
a position then adopted by the Restatement and several other cases.128 
 
126. Canada v. City of Shawnee, 64 P.2d 694, 699 (Okla. 1936).  
127. Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 248 A.2d 106, 116–17 (Md. 1968).  
128. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 818 (1939) (“To the extent that 
a person is not liable for withdrawing subterranean waters from the land 
of another, he is not liable for a subsidence of the other’s land which is 
caused by the withdrawal.”); see, e.g., N.Y. Cont’l Jewell Filtration Co. 
v. Jones, 37 App. D.C. 511, 512, 518 (1911) (reversing judgment for 
land subsidence and cracking of house’s foundation caused by the 
withdrawal of subsurface water in the course of constructing a tunnel); 
Elster v. City of Springfield, 30 N.E. 274, 278–79 (Ohio 1892) (holding 
that landowner cannot be prevented from legitimate use of land even if 
the effect is to drain a reservoir used by an adjoining landowner); 
Langbrook Props., Ltd. v. Surrey Cnty. Council, [1969] 3 All E.R. 1424 
(Ch.) 1424 (Eng.) (holding that plaintiffs did not have a claim against 
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This result is not dictated by Acton because Acton did not hold that 
a neighbor is privileged to pump subsurface water no matter what the 
injury to the neighbor; Acton dealt only with the diversion of water. 
A Texas Supreme Court justice, in a dissenting opinion, aptly noted 
the error:  
The court has decided this cause upon the mistaken belief that 
the case is governed by the ownership of ground water. 
Plaintiffs assert no ownerships to the percolating waters 
pumped and extracted from the ground by defendants. They 
make no complaint that their own wells have been or will be 
pumped dry. They seek no damages for the defendants’ sale of 
the water. Plaintiffs’ action calls for no change in nor even a 
review of the English rule of “absolute ownership” of ground 
water, the American rule of “reasonable use” of ground water, 
nor the Texas rule of “nonwasteful” use of ground water. They 
claim no correlative rights in the water. The Texas law of 
percolating waters is not put in issue by this suit . . . . 
Plaintiffs’ complaint is that defendants are causing subsidence 
of their land. They assert an absolute right to keep the surface 
of their land at its natural horizon. The landowners’ right to the 
subjacent support for their land is the only right in suit . . . . It 
is no more logical to say that this is a case concerning the right 
to ground water than it would be correct in a case in which an 
adjoining landowner removed lateral support by a caterpillar to 
say that the case would be governed by the law of caterpillars. 
In making this decision about one’s right to subjacent support, I 
would use as analogies other kinds of cases concerning support, 
such as the right to lateral support. 
A landowner’s right to lateral support for his land is an absolute 
right. The instrument employed in causing land to slough off, 
cave in or wash away is not the real subject of inquiry. The 
inquiry is whether the adjoining owner actually causes the loss 
of support. Whether the support is destroyed by excavation, 
ditching, the flowing of water, the pumping of water, unnatural 
pressure, unnatural suction, or explosives, the right to support 
is the same, and it is an absolute right.129 
 
defendants for settlement damage caused by defendant removing water 
beneath plaintiff’s land). 
129. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 31 (Tex. 
1978) (Pope, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). To be fair, Texas has at 
least employed several exceptions to the erroneous rule. Id. at 30 
(majority opinion) (adopting rule going forward that “if the landowner’s 
manner of withdrawing ground water from his land is negligent, willfully 
wasteful, or for the purpose of malicious injury, and such conduct is a 
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Courts in other states agree that subsidence injury is not damnum 
absque injuria when caused by the withdrawal of subsurface water.130 
3. Why the Old Shoes Do Not Fit 
As we showed in Part I, the conventional views do not accurately 
describe the legal doctrine developed by judges in the common law of 
subsurface resources. We believe that these errors resulted from 
attempts to explain the legal relationship between surface owners 
according to familiar paradigms. Although we hesitate to point fingers 
more than we already have, and are conscious that many scholars 
simply repeated the conventional wisdom, the academic literature on 
the relevant legal relationships is replete with inappropriate 
generalizations about cases that dealt with narrow, specialized issues. 
Nonetheless, it is important to point out the cases that are inapplicable 
to the legal relationship of surface owners. Commentators have 
inappropriately relied upon cases resolving disputes between competing 
claims to development rights in the same parcel;131 cases determining 
 
proximate cause of the subsidence of the land of others, he will be liable 
for the consequences of his conduct”). 
130. The dissent in Friendswood Development notes that “[r]espectable 
American authority supports the rule that a landowner has the right to 
the support afforded by subterranean waters.” Id. at 32 (Pope, J., 
dissenting) (citing N.Y. Cent. R. Co. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 149 
N.E.2d 680, 682 (Mass. 1958); Gamer v. Town of Milton, 195 N.E.2d 65, 
67 (Mass. 1964); Cabot v. Kingman, 44 N.E. 344, 345 (Mass. 1896); 
Bjorvatn v. Pac. Mech. Constr., Inc., 464 P.2d 432, 434–35 (Wash. 
1970) (en banc); Muskatell v. City of Seattle, 116 P.2d 363, 371 (Wash. 
1941); Farnandis v. Great N. Ry. Co., 84 P. 18, 21–22 (Wash. 1906); 1 
Am. Jur. 2d Adjoining Landowners § 80 (1962); 2 C.J.S. Adjoining 
Landowners § 38 (1972); Annotation, Right of Property Owner to Repel 
or Remove Flood Water from Building, 4 A.L.R. 1104 (1919)); see also 
Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co., 140 S.E. 57, 60–61 (W. Va. 1927) 
(holding that diversion of subsurface waters as a result of mining on 
adjacent land does not give rise to a claim if sufficient support leaves 
the surface undisturbed). 
131. Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 673 (1895); Osborn v. Ark. Territorial 
Oil & Gas Co., 146 S.W. 122, 125 (Ark. 1912); Triger v. Carter Oil Co., 
23 N.E.2d 55, 56 (Ill. 1939); Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 84 
N.E. 53, 54 (Ill. 1908); Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Fyffe, 294 S.W. 176, 178 
(Ky. 1927); Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 88 So. 
723 (La. 1920); De Moss v. Sample, 78 So. 482, 482–83 (La. 1918); Rives 
v. Gulf Ref. Co. of La., 62 So. 623, 624–25 (La. 1913); Wagner v. 
Mallory, 62 N.E. 584, 585 (N.Y. 1902)); Rich v. Doneghey, 177 P. 86, 
89, 100 (Okla. 1918); Hamilton v. Foster, 116 A. 50, 52 (Pa. 1922); 
Mandle v. Gharing, 100 A. 535, 537 (Pa. 1917); Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 
A. 109, 110 (Pa. 1896); Blakley v. Marshall, 34 A. 564, 565 (Pa. 1896); 
Wettengel v. Gormley, 28 A. 934, 935 (Pa. 1894); Brown v. Vandergrift, 
80 Pa. 142, 142 (1875); Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229, 249 (1866); Kier 
v. Peterson, 41 Pa. 357, 360–62 (1861)); Murray v. Allard, 43 S.W. 355, 
355 (Tenn. 1897); Bender v. Brooks, 127 S.W. 168, 168 (Tex. 1910); 
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whether extraction of oil and gas by trustees, life estate holders, and 
general lessees amounts to waste of the estate;132 and cases determining 
tax liabilities.133 
Cases in which courts interpreted lease rights in disputes between 
individuals who claimed development rights in the same parcels 
represent the most frequently cited inapplicable decisions. Resolving 
these disputes, courts took various views on the issue of title to the 
resources in the ground and used the concept of title.134 But these 
decisions simply do not tell us anything useful about the rights of surface 
owners against each other. Cases that determined the development rights 
of surface owners decided issues that are distinct from questions about 
the alienability of whatever these rights are. Any discussion of issues 
surrounding the sale or lease of oil and gas rights is separate from 
issues about the nature of property rights with respect to neighbors. 
The Texas Supreme Court observed in an early case that the 
questions posed in these two classes of cases are distinct: 
The general question of whether one landowner is entitled to 
damages for oil or water drawn from his land by a well sunk by 
 
Gillette v. Mitchell, 214 S.W. 619, 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Jennings 
v. S. Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 372 (W. Va. 1913); Hall v. S. Penn Oil 
Co., 76 S.E. 124, 124–25 (W. Va. 1912); Rymer v. S. Penn Oil Co., 46 
S.E. 559, 565 (W. Va. 1904). 
132. Isom v. Rex Crude Oil Co., 82 P. 317, 318 (Cal. 1905); Ohio Oil Co. v. 
Daughetee, 88 N.E. 818, 820 (Ill. 1909); Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co., 95 N.E. 
225, 226 (Ind. 1911); Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman, 75 P. 995, 997 (Kan. 
1904); Gerkins v. Ky. Salt Co., 39 S.W. 444, 444 (Ky. 1897); Marshall v. 
Mellon, 36 A. 201, 201 (Pa. 1897); Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198, 
201–02 (1878); Haskell v. Sutton, 44 S.E 533, 538 (W. Va. 1903); Wilson 
v. Youst, 28 S.E. 781, 781 (W. Va. 1897); Williamson v. Jones, 19 S.E. 
436, 436 (W. Va. 1894); Wood Cnty. Petroleum Co. v. W. Va. Transp. 
Co., 28 W. Va. 210, 219 (1886). 
133. Stephens Cnty. v. Mid-Kan. Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923); 
Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717 (Tex. 1915). 
134. Some states do not delay title under an ownership-in-place theory of 
ownership of subsurface pool resources. See, e.g., Mid-Kan. Oil & Gas, 
254 S.W. at 292 (“[G]as and oil in place are minerals and realty, subject 
to ownership, severance, and sale, while embedded in the sands or rocks 
beneath the earth’s surface, in like manner and to the same extent as is 
coal or any other solid mineral.”); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 
S.W.3d 814, 831–32 (Tex. 2012) (determining as a matter of first 
impression in a takings case that groundwater is owned in place). Other 
states delay title under a no-ownership-in-place theory. See, e.g., Sun 
Oil Co. v. Oswell, 62 So. 2d 783, 787 (Ala. 1953); NCNB Tex. Nat’l 
Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So. 2d 212, 223 (Ala. 1993); Triger v. Carter 
Oil Co., 23 N.E.2d 55, 56 (Ill. 1939); Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughetee, 88 N.E. 
818, 820 (Ill. 1909); Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 84 N.E. 53, 54 
(Ill. 1908); State v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 809, 812 (Ind. 1898). 
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an adjoining landowner on his own land is very different from the 
question of whether the owner of a part of a tract of land from 
which prior to his acquisition of title a third person had acquired 
from the former owner the exclusive right to take oil therefrom is 
entitled to his proportionate share of the oil so taken.135 
The court not only noticed the distinction, it explicitly stated that the 
decisions regarding the questions in the neighbor dispute cases are not 
“controlling upon the question presented” in lease and sale dispute 
cases.136 The doctrines and decisions that resolve the myriad of 
disputes over the authority to exploit a particular parcel do not apply 
to disputes between neighbors—just as the law governing disputes 
over the ownership of horses do not apply to the determination of an 
owner’s liability for damage caused by the owner’s horse. The cases 
may share subject matter and language, but no more. 
B. Subsurface Resource Pools Are Shared Property and 
Surface Owners Are Tenants in Common Without Accounting Rights 
Properly understood, common law decisions recognize the shared 
ownership of subsurface resource pools, just as with surface resource 
pools, because of the migratory character of the resources. 
1. Common Law Coordinates More Decision Making Among 
Shared Owners than Decision Making Among Neighbors  
There is an important and evident distinction in the role of the 
common law in decisional coordination among individual owners and 
among individuals whose unity of interest in a common resource both 
justifies and requires greater legal oversight. The scope of common 
law decisional coordination between neighboring individual owners is 
less than between those who share ownership of resources. 
The greater coordination between shared owners can be found both 
in the regulation of property whose current ownership is divided among 
 
135. Gillette v. Mitchell, 214 S.W. 619, 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). Along 
these lines, a plaintiff’s attempted attack on the validity of an oil rights 
conveyance based on “[t]he doctrine that the owner of land has no 
property right in the oil or gas beneath the surface until he has reduced 
it to possession” was succinctly rebuffed by the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana: 
The doctrine . . . in no manner denies to such owner the 
exclusive right to the use of the surface for the purposes of such 
reduction [of oil and gas to possession], or for any other purpose 
. . . but, to the contrary, concedes that right, as inherent in the 
title to the land, . . . and the right may be sold, as may be any 
other right, and may carry with it the right to the oil and gas 
that may be found and reduced to possession. 
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 213 (La. 1920). 
136. Gillette, 214 S.W. at 622.  
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several individuals and in the regulation of property whose ownership is 
divided over time, such as the relationship between a lessor and a lessee 
or a life tenant and a remainderman.137 The waste action is recognized 
as between co-owners and as between present and future interest 
holders, but almost never recognized between neighbors.138  
If the private ownership of neighboring parcels is individuated, 
there is no inherent unity of interest in decision making; society 
recognizes individual ownership precisely because it wants an owner’s 
decisions to reflect her individual preferences. Neighbors exercise a 
vast array of decisional authority without affecting one another in a 
legally cognizable way. Also, neighbors make a vast number of 
decisions that strongly affect other neighbors, but the decisions are 
fewer and their effect is dissipated in the surrounding community. 
Neighbors have common interests, but these are diffused into an ill-
defined class of individuals. And, as the academic literature as of late 
constantly reminds us, the desires of the community are a diverse 
thicket, not a one-dimensional set of either positive or negative 
contributions to the local value of property.139 Thus, there is no 
immediate, tangible, and limited unity of interest that both impels 
and justifies judicial coordination. Rather, the effect of decision 
making by individuated property owners is left to legislative and 
private governance. 
Moreover, when resources are individually owned, the law relies 
on the market to coordinate land use decisions. An individual owner 
whose land use decisions upset neighbors generally also upsets the 
property’s potential buyers. As a result, the cost of that decision is 
often internalized to the person who makes the decision. As long as 
the cost is internalized, the market will coordinate land use decisions 
by discouraging decisions the community (through the market) does 
not value and rewarding decisions the community (through the 
market) does value.  
 
137. Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 Ariz. 
St. L.J. 1075, 1093–94 (1997) (noting that most modern property rights 
are defined by the object and the conditions for its ownership but not 
the incidents of ownership, leaving that final piece subject to judicial 
determination). As a corollary to this indeterminate framework, courts 
in the exercise of their discretion more readily consider other shared 
owners’ interests than neighbors’ interest when defining the incidents of 
property ownership. 
138. But see, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (enjoining the demolition of decedent’s house, 
which she had prescribed in her will, based on the harmful effects of the 
demolition on the community, including the neighbors who brought the 
action). 
139. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning 
Budget,” 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 81, 97 (2011) (citing Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 22–25 (2d ed. 1963)). 
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Because of these factors, many activities of individual owners that 
have the knowing effect of injuring a neighbor’s quiet enjoyment of 
property are not actionable. Thus, the owners of the Eden Roc Hotel 
had no recourse when the neighboring Fontainebleau Hotel erected a 
residential tower that cast a shadow over the Eden Roc’s pool at 
midafternoon.140 Nuisance law itself provides no cause of action for 
interferences that are judged to be nonsignificant. By contrast, the 
common law applies a higher standard of conduct for dealing with one 
another when there is shared ownership. The unity of interest makes 
the judicial supervision of conduct to prohibit acts solely motivated 
by ill will appropriate. 
The common law regulation of shared rather than individuated 
ownership is more than simply a prohibition of intrinsically wrongful 
conduct from a golden rule perspective. Instead, the common law 
regulation of shared ownership regulates decisions that are wrongful 
only because they are opposed to the unity of interest inherent in 
shared ownership. The failure to improve one’s neighborhood by 
purchasing a high quality mailbox may be, for the sake of 
demonstration, contrary to the communal interest of individual 
owners, but it would not be actionable at common law on that ground 
alone because there is no additional element of wrongdoing. But a co-
owner who leases commonly owned property for far below market 
value may create actionable waste because it is contrary to the united 
interest of the common owners in deriving value from the property, 
not because suboptimal leasing is in itself wrongdoing. 
2. Surface Owners Share Ownership of Subsurface Resource Pools 
Because the Resources are Migratory 
The common law recognition of the causes of action for malicious 
interference, waste, and unreasonable exploitation coordinates decision 
making among surface owners not simply as neighbors but as 
individuals whose unity of interest in a commonly owned resource 
justifies and requires judicial oversight. 
The coordination problem inherent in subsurface resource pools 
arises because the decisions of surface owners (or their licensees) are 
so interdependent that it is not possible for society to rely on 
 
140. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 
357, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). For Professor Gerhart’s property 
casebook, Property: Our Social Institution, we sought a picture of the 
shadow cast over the pool. As soon as the subject was broached with a 
member of the Eden Roc staff, she immediately responded “you are 
referring to the spite wall.” She also indicated that finding a picture in 
the archive would be difficult, as any pictures showing the shadow over 
the pool would have been destroyed. Luckily, she found one picture that 
shows the shadow creeping ominously toward the pool in early afternoon. 
See Peter M. Gerhart, Property: Our Social Institution 355 
(2012), available at www.availableat.org. 
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independent and loosely coordinated decisions, as is true for 
individually owned property. Each surface owner’s decisions about 
where and how to extract resources have a potentially immediate and 
direct impact on the well-being of other surface owners through their 
ability to extract wealth from the subsurface resource pool. Like co-
owners of property, each surface owner has an interest in the pool 
that cannot be easily separated from the interests of other surface 
owners. Accordingly, courts have recognized that—because subsurface 
resource pools are migratory—decisions about the use of the resource 
are interdependent, and courts have thus required that exploitation 
decisions have a reasonable basis. 
According to the shared property paradigm, the surface owners 
own subsurface resource pools much like the ownership of tenants in 
common.141 Indeed, this proposition is explicitly stated in early cases. 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky 
Heating Co. gives perhaps the best exposition of the nature of a 
surface owner’s rights in subsurface resource pools and the judicially 
enforceable obligations surface owners have among one another: 
The right of the surface owners to take gas from subjacent fields 
or reservoirs is a right in common. There is no property in the 
gas until it is taken. Before it is taken it is fugitive in its nature, 
and belongs in common to the owners of the surface. The right 
of the owners to take it is without stint; the only limitation 
being that it must be taken for a lawful purpose and in a 
reasonable manner. Each tenant in common is restricted to a 
reasonable use of this right, and each is entitled to the natural 
flow of the gas from the subjacent fields, and any unlawful 
exercise of this right, by any tenant in common, which results in 
injury to the natural right of any other tenant or surface owner, 
is an actionable wrong.142 
 
141. Just as tenants in common have an undivided interest in the property, 
sharing owners have a unity of interest in the pool because exploitation 
of any part of the pool potentially affects every part of the pool. Just as 
tenants in common have individual interests in the property by virtue of 
their right to seek a partition, sharing owners have an individual 
interest by virtue of being surface owners. For tenants in common the 
individual interest is determined by the conveyance to the tenants. For 
sharing owners, the individual interest is determined by the percentage 
of relevant surface area each owner has.  
142. Louisville Gas Co. v. Ky. Heating Co., 111 S.W. 374, 376 (Ky. 1908). 
This exposition is probably so superior because Kentucky did not adopt 
Acton until fifteen years later. Nourse v. Andrews, 255 S.W. 84, 86 (Ky. 
1923). Typically, adoption of a nuisance exception for injuries to 
subsurface resource pools preceded common law consideration of a 
dispute over the reasonableness of exploitation of a subsurface resource 
pools. As this Part demonstrates, recognition of shared ownership is not 
inconsistent with this nuisance exception because it results only in an 
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Similarly, in Manufacturers’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & 
Oil Co., the Indiana Supreme Court refers to common ownership of a 
common reservoir, not tenancy in common, but it is equally clear that 
the ownership of subsurface resource pools is shared: 
The final conclusion of the court is that one common owner of 
the gas in the common reservoir cannot devest all the others of 
their rights, without wrongdoing. The acts of 1891 and 1893 are 
an express recognition by the legislature of the qualified 
ownership of the common owners in the gas in the common 
reservoir, and any act therein forbidden may be, according to 
the circumstances, the subject of a suit at law or a proceeding in 
equity by the person injured, as well as the foundation of a 
public prosecution. Independently, however, of any statute, for 
the reason already stated, the common owners of the gas in the 
common reservoir, separately or together, have the right to 
enjoin any and all acts of another owner which will materially 
injure, or which will involve the destruction of, the property in 
the common fund, or supply of gas.143 
Other courts and commentators have found another way to 
express shared ownership using the framework of correlative rights.144 
The Florida Supreme Court explains: 
Property owned by one party may be so situated and 
conditioned with reference to the property of another as that 
the rights of ownership and the uses of such properties are 
interdependent or correlative. In such cases each owner should 
so reasonably use his property as not to injure the property 
rights of others. 
The property rights relative to the passage of waters that 
naturally percolate through the land of one owner to and through 
 
elimination of accounting. Still, accounting is a right almost universally 
available for tenants in common, and therefore it makes sense that the 
prior foreclosure of the accounting remedy in a state would cramp the 
language in subsequent opinions recognizing other rights of shared 
ownership between surface owners. 
143. Mfrs.’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Ind. Natural Gas & Oil Co., 57 N.E. 912, 917 
(Ind. 1900). 
144. See generally Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1979); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012); 
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 
2008); 1 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas 
§ 4.3, at 120–22 (1987); Kramer & Anderson, supra note 93; R.O. 
Kellam, A Century of Correlative Rights, 12 Baylor L. Rev. 1 (1960); 
Theresa D. Poindexter, Comment, Correlative Rights Doctrine, Not the 
Rule of Capture, Provides Correct Analysis for Resolving Hydraulic 
Fracturing Cases, 48 Washburn L.J. 755 (2009). 
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the land of another owner are correlative; and each landowner is 
restricted to a reasonable use of his property as it affects 
subsurface waters passing to or from the land of another.145 
The correlative rights concept unnecessarily and misleadingly 
duplicates the concept of shared rights. Tenants in common and 
concurrent and future interest holders have the same correlative 
rights as surface owners over a common pool. Using terms like 
correlative rights unnecessarily diffuses the common law and makes 
the law in one area appear to be different from the law in another 
area, obfuscating the unity of the law. Advocates and judges who 
evaluate disputes between surface owners over exploitation decisions 
ought to understand that the rights are akin to rights of tenants in 
common and present and future interest holders, so that they do not 
unnecessarily limit the scope of their research and consideration.  
3. Rights of Shared Owners of Subsurface Resource Pools Are  
Limited (Not Eliminated) Because the Resources Are Hidden 
Courts have recognized nearly the full panoply of causes of action 
available between shared owners of property that are not generally 
available between neighbors: malicious interference, waste, and 
unreasonable use. The only stick in the bundle of shared ownership 
rights that is generally available to tenants in common but not to 
surface owners of subsurface resource pools is a cause of action that 
would require one sharing owner to account to the other sharing owners 
for the value of the resource that the owner displaced.146 But this is 
understandable from the nature of the resource. As we have shown, 
courts have generally refused to hear causes of action for interferences 
with subsurface resource pools because the hidden character of the 
resources limits the judicial capacity to effectively determine liability 
and provide redress. The Supreme Court of Louisiana put it perfectly: 
“A review of the cases . . . shows that damages were not allowed 
because of the uncertain and speculative nature of the loss complained 
 
145. Cason v. Fla. Power Co., 76 So. 535, 536 (Fla. 1917). 
146. Gruger v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 135 P.2d 485, 488–89 (Okla. 1943) 
(“Assuming that there might be circumstances . . . which would 
authorize the district court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, to 
grant relief to such owner, which question is not now before us and we 
do not decide, we think it is clear that no such state of facts is stated in 
the petition. We conclude that the petition does not contain a statement 
of facts making it the duty of the defendant to account to it for oil and 
gas alleged to have been drained from under their lots, and the 
demurrer was properly sustained.”); Canada v. City of Shawnee, 64 P.2d 
694, 696 (Okla. 1936) (“This does not mean that there shall be an 
apportionment of subterranean percolating water between adjacent 
landowners, for such a thing is often, if not always, impossible . . . .”).  
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of.”147 It follows that as the technology of determining the flow of 
subsurface resources improves, courts should be increasingly willing to 
afford accounting rights by requiring a fair division of the value of 
extractions from a subsurface resource pool.148 
Has technology improved since Acton was decided in 1843? 
Apparently yes. The Texas Supreme Court as early as 1935 observed: 
[W]hen an oil field has been fairly tested and developed, experts 
can determine approximately the amount of oil and gas in place 
in a common pool, and can also equitably determine the amount 
of oil and gas recoverable by the owner of each tract of land 
under certain operating conditions.149 
Yet accountings are still not generally afforded nearly eighty years 
later, despite the fact that technology has improved even further in 
the meantime.150 It appears that judicial perceptions of the capacity to 
provide subsurface resource accounting have not caught up to 
advancing technology, but this might be attributable in part to the 
fact that the conventional views trace the lack of remedy for drainage 
to the migratory, rather than the hidden, character of the subsurface 
resources. Once it is understood that the hidden character of the 
resources is the factor that impelled courts to refuse to order an 
accounting for diversion, the way should be clear to allow sharing 
owners to determine their ownership shares and for courts to enforce 
reasonable allocations.   
 
147. McCoy v. Ark. Natural Gas Co., 165 So. 632, 633 (La. 1936). 
148. This does not mean that the Acton exception for a nuisance action 
would be removed for interferences that occur from flowing water. 
Accounting actions in oil and gas cases in a pool or shale deposit pose 
fewer problems for courts because they are in a determinable space and 
will at some point be exhausted. Some injuries from the use of 
subsurface resources are likely to remain damnum absque injuria when 
the diversions cannot be adequately measured.  
149. Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tex. 1935).  
150. In Coastal Oil & Gas, an expert “testified that because of the fracing 
operation on the Coastal No. 1 well, 25–35% of the gas it produced 
drained from Share 13.” Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy 
Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2008). 
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4. The Shared Ownership of Subsurface Resource Pools Is  
Constitutionally Significant  
The shared nature of subsurface resource pools is evident from the 
seminal decision on the constitutionality of statutes that regulate oil 
and gas for waste, Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana.151  
The Court at the outset noted that 
oil and gas are comingled and contained in a natural reservoir 
which lies beneath an extensive area of country, and that as thus 
situated the gas and oil are capable of flowing from place to 
place, and are hence susceptible of being drawn off by wells from 
any point, provided they penetrate into the reservoir. . . . From 
this it must necessarily come to pass that the entire volume of 
gas and oil is in some measure liable to be decreased by the act of 
any one who, within the superficial area, bores wells from the 
surface and strikes the reservoir containing the oil and gas.152 
The Court recognized that surface owners do not exclusively own oil 
and gas residing beneath their land because this degree of ownership 
does not arise until the surface owner achieves “dominion and control 
by actual possession” of the oil and gas.153 The Court then made clear 
that oil and gas are not commons property, distinguishing oil and gas 
from the classic case of commonly owned property, “animals ferae 
naturae.” Such animals “belong to the ‘negative community;’ in other 
words, are public things subject to the absolute control of the State, 
which, although it allows them to be reduced to possession, may at its 
will not only regulate but wholly forbid their future taking.”154 While 
oil and gas share some similarity to animals ferae naturae, the Court 
held they are constitutionally distinct because the “identity” between 
the two “is for many reasons wanting”:  
In things ferae naturae all are endowed with the power of seeking 
to reduce a portion of the public property to the domain of 
private ownership by reducing them to possession. In the case of 
natural gas and oil no such right exists in the public. It is 
vested only in the owners in fee of the surface of the earth 
within the area of the gas field. 155 
 
151. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900). 
152. Id. at 201. 
153. Id. at 208.  
154. Id. at 208–09 (quoting Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896), 
overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979)). 
155. Id. at 209. The Supreme Court subsequently missed this crucial 
distinction when reviewing this portion of the case in Walls v. Midland 
Carbon Co. by reporting that in the earlier case “the analogy between 
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Accordingly, surface proprietors “could not be absolutely deprived of” 
the right to reduce oil and gas to possession that “belongs to them.”156 
Under this constitutional framework for takings, oil and gas in situ 
is not private property (because there is insufficient dominion and 
control by actual possession) and it is not commons property (because 
the rights belong only to surface owners). All that is left is to 
recognize the name of this constitutional class of property: shared 
property.157 Noncompensated regulation of shared property is more 
 
oil and gas and animals ferae naturae was declared.” Walls v. Midland 
Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 317 (1920). As the Court made clear in Ohio 
Oil Co., if there were perfect analogy between oil and gas and wild animals, 
then oil and gas would be commons property subject to regulation at the 
absolute discretion of the states as sovereign authority. The Court in 
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana addressed the commons property regime and 
the analogy to wild animals because the Indiana Supreme Court upheld 
the waste statute on the basis of this analogy in a case cited to by the 
summary affirmances of both the case and the companion case below. 
Ohio Oil Co. v. State, 50 N.E. 1125 (Ind. 1898) (summarily affirming 
judgment with citation to State v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 809 (Ind. 
1898)); Ohio Oil Co. v. State, 50 N.E. 1124 (Ind. 1898) (companion case 
below summarily affirming judgment with citation to State v. Ohio Oil 
Co., 49 N.E. 809 (Ind. 1898)); State v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 809, 812 
(Ind. 1898) (holding waste statute constitutional by analogy to commons 
property regulations of wild animals and fish). 
156. Id. 
157. The classification of oil and gas as shared, not common, property for 
constitutional purposes also limits a state’s power to regulate interstate 
transmission of oil and gas. See Kan. Natural Gas Co. v. Haskell, 172 F. 
545, 564 (C.C.E.D. Okla. 1909) (“[T]he contention of defendants that 
the natural gas found within the territorial limits of the state is the 
common heritage of the people of the state, which may be conserved and 
preserved by the state as trustee of those things in which the people 
have a common interest, as flowing streams, wild animal life, etc., is 
unsound and must be denied.”). The states have upheld similar waste 
statutes before and after the decision in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana. 
Townsend v. State, 47 N.E. 19, 20–23 (Ind. 1897) (holding waste statute 
constitutional by analogy to various commons property regulations, 
namely wild animals, fish, and beach sand); People ex rel. Stevenot v. 
Associated Oil Co., 294 P. 717, 723 (Cal. 1930) (in bank) (“Whatever 
refinements may be suggested as to the definition of the nature of the 
property right in gas and oil beneath the surface and uncaptured, we are 
entirely satisfied that the waste of these natural resources may be 
regulated and the unreasonable waste thereof may be prohibited in the 
exercise of the police power of the state . . . .”). The California Supreme 
Court commented, perhaps inaccurately, on the nature of the class of 
property recognized in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana: 
The decision in that case defines the so-called correlative right 
not necessarily as a right to a fixed distributive or proportional 
share of the oil and gas underlying the surface, which no other 
owner of soil overlying the same reservoir may take and use 
beneficially, but as a coequal right to take whatever of the oil 
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permissible than regulation of private property precisely because it is 
shared property.158 
III. Private Governance of Shared Property  
The shared property paradigm suggests that decisions about the 
exploitation of the subsurface pool should be made in a unified way 
that takes into account the joint interests of the shared owners in the 
value of the pool, while protecting the individual interests of surface 
owners in the portion of pool that underlies their property. Assuming 
that a single surface owner or lessee cannot acquire all the rights in 
the pool, this paradigm suggests that several principles ought to 
inform the legal approach to shared property. Significantly, because 
the common law has developed with an intuitive sense of the rights 
and responsibilities of sharing owners, no major common law decisions 
need to be overruled in order to adopt those principles. 
In order to establish private governance of the exploitation of their 
shared property, sharing owners ought to agree on the percentage of 
ownership to be held by each surface owner in advance of drilling. 
Although the hidden nature of the resource once made that task 
impossible, modern seismic technology has advanced to a level that 
suggests that assigning shares to the sharing owners is now reasonably 
feasible.159 Undoubtedly, the shares might not be determined with 
scientific precision and would not be free from doubt, so sharing owners 
would want to build in mechanisms for adjusting the shares as new 
information about the precise location of the resource develops, but 
negotiations toward an agreement in principle should be possible, and 
courts are available to help resolve factual disputes. 
The law should function to encourage sharing owners to establish 
a governance mechanism that would allow them to make unified 
decisions about whether, when, and how they exploit the resource. 
 
and gas can be captured, so long as waste, as defined by the 
statute, is not committed. 
People ex rel. Stevenot, 294 P. at 722. 
158. The limits of noncompensated regulation of shared resources were 
explored in Bernstein v. Bush, 177 P.2d 913, 918 (Cal. 1947) (in bank) 
(“[D]isapproval of the petitioners’ proposal to drill a well in accordance 
with the notice of intention on file, if effective to prevent such drilling, 
would amount to a deprivation of the petitioners’ right, co-equal with 
the right of surrounding owners and lessees, to recover their fair share of 
the oil and gas from the common source of supply, and consequently 
would infringe upon the constitutional guaranties invoked.”). 
159. For example, in Coastal Oil & Gas, an expert “testified that because of 
the fracing operation on the Coastal No. 1 well, 25–35% of the gas it 
produced drained from Share 13.” Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza 
Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2008). 
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The precise governance mechanism would vary with the number of 
sharing owners. One model for shared governance comes from the 
governance mechanisms used by common interest communities. Under 
this model, sharing owners would be assigned votes in proportion to 
the amount of the pool underlying their property; on the basis of 
those votes, they would adopt a charter outlining the basic rights and 
responsibilities of the shared ownership and establish a governing 
body to make exploitation decisions. The owners would then elect 
individuals to the governing body. The governing body would make 
exploitation decisions on behalf of the sharing owners, subject to 
judicial review that would determine whether the decisions conformed 
to reasonable governing regulations, were themselves reasonable, and 
followed principles of appropriate process (including, for important 
decisions, the protection of minority rights).  
The shared owners can choose between two governance models, a 
unified exploitation model or a decentralized exploitation model. Under 
the unified exploitation model, the governing body would itself exploit 
the pool on behalf of the shared owners, but individual interests 
would be protected by the requirement of reasonable decisions, 
accounting, and judicial review. Under the decentralized exploitation 
model, the individual owners would separately exploit the pool on 
their own behalf according to rules and regulations established by the 
governing body.160 Governing bodies under both unified and 
decentralized models would establish procedures for assigning 
“ownership” rights to the pool (based on the ownership of surface 
property) and would adjust those rights in response to new 
information generated from new technology. 
We anticipate that private governance structures can be privately 
established and operated (subject to judicial review), with a minimum 
 
160. Macaulay offers an apt description of an early example of one such 
regulated governance regime: 
There was a Turkey Company, the members of which 
contributed to a general fund, and had in return the exclusive 
privilege of trafficking with the Levant: but those members 
trafficked, each on his own account: they forestalled each other; 
they undersold each other: one became rich; another became 
bankrupt. The corporation meanwhile watched over the common 
interest of all the members, furnished the crown with the means 
of maintaining an embassy at Constantinople, and placed at 
several important ports consuls and vice-consuls, whose business 
was to keep the Pacha and the Cadi in good-humour, and to 
arbitrate in disputes among Englishmen. 
5 Thomas Babington Macaulay, The History of England From 
the Accession of James the Second 307 (1899). The Old East India 
Company was a unit governance regime, but the New East India 
Company was structured according to the Turkey Company model as a 
regulated governance regime. Id. 
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of legislative input needed to guide how the governing bodies are 
established and operated. Again, the model of the common interest 
community suggests that private agreements subject to judicial review 
are superior to legislative regulation because the sharing owners know 
best how to make exploitation decisions and because the decisions are 
subject to well-developed standards of reasonableness that lend 
themselves to development and application along common law lines.  
There might, however, be one area in which legislative 
intervention would be important. The ability of sharing owners to 
reach agreement on a governance mechanism and joint decision 
making would be subject to the holdout problem. Owners might feign 
reluctance to exploit the shared property in order to gain an 
advantage in the negotiations. Therefore, private governance might 
require a mechanism for ensuring that if a large majority of the 
owners of a common pool could agree on an allocation of shares and 
an appropriate governance mechanism, other owners would be forced 
to accept the decisions of the majority. That mechanism would induce 
holdout owners to negotiate in good faith in order to protect their 
interests and have an impact on the unified decisions.  
Conclusion 
The law’s need to accommodate the particular and the general—
to understand the outcome in particular cases in terms of general 
directions that others can follow—requires legal theory to move easily 
between the pieces of a mosaic and the overall picture the pieces portray. 
This requires theory that can move beyond general principles whose 
content is unexplored and undefined, while simultaneously capturing 
the relationship between the details in a way that binds them 
together into a coherent pattern. For this reason, successful theory 
depends on a framework or paradigm that captures the relevant 
variables and their relationships to each other. When formed at too 
diffuse a level or when focused on too many particulars, theory 
provides insufficient guidance; when focused on too few particulars, 
theory distorts reality. 
 The theory applicable to subsurface resource pools has never 
presented a comfortable picture because it has continually vacillated 
between theories of individual ownership and common ownership that 
has left the law’s imprint smudged and confused. Attempts to bring 
the law into focus by espousing theories that focus on one feature over 
others—such as capture or location—or by giving up on theory and 
allowing resource exploitation to be understood as a race (the “Drill, 
baby, drill!” v) have given the law applicable to subsurface resource 
pools a vacillating, uneven, and opaque character. 
Because the widespread deployment of horizontal slickwater 
fracturing has threatened traditional property interests by requiring 
the driller to cross surface boundaries, in this Article we have taken a 
fresh look at the cases that determine rights and responsibilities to 
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subsurface resource pools. What we have found is that common law 
courts have implicitly applied a theory of shared ownership to 
controversies arising from the exploitation of subsurface resource 
pools, one that they modified only to accommodate the difficulty of 
tracing the flow of hidden resources. This finding ought to change the 
way we understand the law applicable to subsurface resource pools, 
for it allows us to integrate into a single theory—a theory of shared 
resources—that actualizes a legal approach to the many controversies 
that such resources generate.  
Under the theory of shared resources, owners of surface property 
over a subsurface pool have a unity of interest in the exploitation of 
the pool that requires each surface owner to act as if she were part of 
unified ownership, but each surface owner has an individual interest 
in the portion of the pool underlying her property. This is the 
paradigm that common law courts have largely applied, and it is the 
theory that should govern our understanding of, and legal approach 
to, horizontal slickwater fracturing. Moreover, now that seismic 
technology has largely removed the hidden nature of resource pools, 
courts can move to fully implement the shared resources paradigm, 
for now the individual shares of the resource pool can be determined 
with a fair degree of accuracy.  
Significantly, the shared property theory can largely be 
implemented through private agreements, rather than legislative or 
regulatory commission dictates. Because surface owners have a unity 
of interest and neither their number nor their idiosyncratic interests 
are great, most of the issues relating to unified exploitation can be 
worked out by negotiations between surface owners acting reasonably 
and in good faith, and subject only to judicial review to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the agreements and to address controversies that 
cannot be resolved by the owners themselves. 
  
 
   
